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INVESTING IN CORPORATE PROCEDURE 
JESSICA ERICKSON* 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate litigation is in crisis. At the state level, shareholder lawsuits 
challenging mergers and other corporate decisions are ubiquitous but rarely 
end with meaningful relief for shareholders. At the federal level, securities class 
actions are rife with ethical challenges and low-value settlements. Over the last 
several decades, multiple groups—including judges, legislatures, and corporate 
boards—have tried to solve this problem, but all have come up short. This 
Article argues that the solution lies in rewriting the procedural rules that govern 
corporate lawsuits. New standing requirements would lead to better screening 
of these claims. Discovery limits and heightened pleading requirements would 
give defendants better tools to fight frivolous claims. All of these new 
procedures, if incorporated into corporate bylaws, would apply wherever the 
corporation is sued to address forum shopping, a common feature in these suits. 
Just as importantly, institutional investors should take the lead in crafting these 
procedures. They stand on both sides of these lawsuits and are therefore 
financially invested in ensuring that corporate lawsuits live up to their potential. 
It is their money on the line if corporate managers breach their fiduciary duties, 
but also their money on the line if corporations have to pay to defend against 
meritless litigation. The time has come for shareholders to invest in procedure 
to solve the enduring problems in corporate litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate litigation is in crisis. Once a key pillar of the law’s efforts to control 
agency costs, corporate litigation is now roundly derided as a failed experiment.1 
In merger litigation, shareholder plaintiffs challenge nearly every significant 
merger and acquisition but too often settle these claims for nonmonetary 
consideration that offers little benefit to the shareholder class.2 In derivative 
litigation a similar phenomenon exists, with shareholders frequently settling for 
modest relief that does not benefit plaintiff corporations.3 And in securities class 
actions, a persistent crop of cases settles for nuisance amounts, while other suits 
raise complex ethical questions about the recruitment of shareholder clients.4 
There are bright spots—meritorious suits that return real value to shareholders—
but overall, the outlook is bleak. 
Shareholder litigation suffers from these problems because it differs from 
other forms of litigation in two important ways.5 First, these suits have far 
 
1 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 851, 852 (2016) (stating that the problems in shareholder litigation have reached 
“crisis proportions”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability 
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 292 (2010) (discussing how problems in shareholder 
litigation “remain intractable despite repeated efforts by Congress and the courts to curb 
highly visible abuses”); James D. Cox, How Understanding the Nature of Corporate Norms 
Can Prevent Their Destruction by Settlements, 66 DUKE L.J. 501, 503 (2016) (stating that 
shareholder litigation “is very much a part of, if not now central to, the litigation-explosion 
debate”). 
2 See Dias v. Purches, No. 7199VCG, 2012 WL 4503174, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2012) 
(stating that after merger announcement, litigation “typically follow[s] like mushrooms 
follow the rain” and disclosure-only settlements “create a risk of excessive merger litigation, 
where the costs to stockholders exceed the benefits”); Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An 
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015) (“Although 
deal litigation is pervasive, these lawsuits rarely result in a monetary recovery for the plaintiff 
class.”). 
3 See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1830 (2010) (“Mounting empirical evidence reveals that the 
vast majority of shareholder derivative suits do not benefit the corporations on whose behalf 
the suits are brought.”); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without 
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 63 (1991) (presenting empirical evidence that parties 
often settled derivative suits in exchange for “cosmetic” corporate governance reforms and 
concluding that “[a] likely explanation” for these settlements “is the need to paper a record to 
justify an award of attorneys’ fees to courts”). 
4 See LAARNI T. BULAN, ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2016), https:// 
www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2016-
Review-and-Analysis [https://perma.cc/XKC4-QWDH]. 
5 Other forms of aggregate litigation, such as consumer class actions, can also suffer from 
these problems. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336-37 (2011) 
(alleging each individual plaintiff’s harm was roughly thirty dollars in class action brought 
against AT&T). In shareholder litigation, however, defendants can exit the litigation in a less 
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greater agency costs. In most lawsuits, the plaintiff directly controls his or her 
attorney. In shareholder litigation, however, most shareholder plaintiffs do not 
have sufficient economic incentives to closely monitor their attorneys.6 As a 
result, these attorneys effectively control the litigation, allowing them to make 
litigation decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholder 
clients.7 Second, shareholder litigation suffers from cost asymmetries.8 In most 
cases, contrary to conventional wisdom, the parties’ litigation costs are roughly 
equivalent.9 In shareholder litigation, however, defendants’ costs far exceed  
plaintiffs’ costs.10 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys have strong incentives to file 
meritless suits, and the defendants have equally strong incentives to settle. 
The legal system has long tried to solve these problems. In the 1990s, 
Congress overhauled the rules governing securities class actions,11 but its efforts 
did too little to preserve meritorious cases and not enough to stamp out meritless 
ones.12 More recently, states deputized corporate directors to adopt new 
procedural rules to govern these lawsuits,13 but directors are typically among the 
 
costly manner by offering nonmonetary consideration in exchange for a settlement. As 
discussed below, this option, which is not available in most types of class actions, exacerbates 
the problems in shareholder litigation. 
6 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (arguing high agency costs in class action and derivative litigation 
primarily are due to the inability of the class to effectively monitor attorneys). 
7 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers 
in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 22 (2016) (“[T]he benefits 
created by [shareholder litigation] are qualified by the litigation agency costs that surround 
them.”). 
8 See Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 61, 71 (2016) 
(“Meritorious or not, however, these cases are profitable for plaintiffs’ lawyers for at least 
two reasons, both having to do with cost asymmetries.”). 
9 The data does not support the oft-repeated claim that discovery costs are out of control 
across the board. For example, in 2009, the Federal Judicial Center found that most attorneys 
in the study stated that they thought the amount and costs of discovery in their cases was “just 
the right amount.” See CASE EMERY G. LEE, III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1-2, 28 (2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/materials/08/CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZC4-FR6Y] (providing 
costs of litigation statistics for plaintiffs and defendants). 
10 See Erickson, supra note 8, at 71 (“[A]lmost all discovery [in shareholder litigation] is 
in the hands of the defendants.”). 
11 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
12 See Section I.A (describing shortcomings of shareholder litigation). 
13 See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (validating 
authority of corporations to adopt fee-shifting provisions in bylaws for unsuccessful plaintiffs 
in intracorporate litigation); In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (discussing Delaware statute authorizing corporations to enact limits on powers of 
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defendants in shareholder lawsuits, and therefore they drafted procedural rules 
that reflect this bias.14 And more recently, Delaware judges tried to take back 
control over these cases by more closely scrutinizing low-value settlements,15 
but their efforts only emboldened plaintiffs’ attorneys to file their cases in other 
jurisdictions.16 In sum, various groups have tried to fix the problems in 
shareholder litigation, but their efforts have all come up short. 
This Article argues that the solution lies in rewriting the procedural rules that 
govern shareholder litigation. Procedure is typically transsubstantive, which 
means that the same rules apply in all civil cases.17 Yet, in practice, civil 
litigation is not one size fits all, and other types of cases do not suffer from the 
problems that wreak such havoc in shareholder litigation.18 Given these unique 
problems, it makes sense to have unique procedural rules for this subset of cases. 
Corporate law has experimented with procedural reform in modest ways,19 
but it has not taken advantage of the full panoply of available options. The field 
 
shareholders that are not contrary to Delaware law). 
14 See, e.g., Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater: 
Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate 
Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 515-16 (2016) (discussing negative implications for 
shareholders resulting from director-imposed fee shifting provisions in shareholder litigation). 
15 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 896 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Given the 
rapid proliferation and current ubiquity of deal litigation, the mounting evidence that 
supplemental disclosures rarely yield genuine benefits for stockholders, the risk of 
stockholders losing potentially valuable claims that have not been investigated with rigor, and 
the challenges of assessing disclosure claims in a nonadversarial settlement process, the 
Court’s historical predisposition toward approving disclosure settlements needs to be 
reexamined.”). 
16 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can 
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN 
CHANGING TIMES 292, 293 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2017) (“The 
stampede of filings to alternative jurisdictions can plausibly be explained by the plaintiffs’ 
bar’s reaction to Trulia and to the cases leading up to it.”). 
17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.”); see also Paul 
D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of 
the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 2067, 2080-
81 (1989) (“Generalism in civil procedure is, in the Anglo-American tradition, about a century 
older than the Federal Rules . . . .”). 
18 Cf. Erickson, supra note 8, at 63 (explaining that “[t]he challenges of prisoner litigation 
are different from the challenges of securities class actions, which are different still from the 
challenges of medical malpractice and patent cases”). 
19 Specifically, a significant number of companies have experimented with two types of 
procedural private ordering: forum selection provisions and fee-shifting provisions. A handful 
have tried a few other types, including minimum ownership requirements and arbitration 
provisions. Other types, such as customized pleading standards or discovery rules, have been 
largely absent from corporate governing documents. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Rohr, Corporate 
Governance, Collective Action and Contractual Freedom: Justifying Delaware’s New 
Restrictions on Private Ordering, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 803, 805 (2017) (describing how “some 
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of civil procedure offers specific solutions to the problems of agency costs and 
cost asymmetries seen in shareholder litigation. When it comes to agency costs, 
forum selection clauses can keep these cases under the eyes of watchful judges, 
especially if they are not waivable by corporate boards. Similarly, new standing 
requirements can ensure that the shareholders who bring these cases have a real 
financial interest in their outcome. When it comes to cost asymmetries, 
heightened pleading requirements can require shareholders to put their cards on 
the table before proceeding to discovery, while cost shifting can provide a more 
equitable distribution of litigation expenses. 
Identifying the right procedural solutions, however, is only one piece of the 
puzzle. It is equally important to identify who will push for these reforms, given 
the long history of failed reform efforts in this area. This history reveals that 
most groups are unlikely to advocate for the right procedural reforms. This void 
presents an opportunity for a new group—institutional investors—to take the 
lead by amending corporate bylaws to include new procedures that would 
govern these cases. Institutional investors have the right financial incentives to 
adopt these procedures because they stand on both sides of shareholder lawsuits. 
It is their money on the line if corporate managers breach their fiduciary duties, 
but also their money on the line if corporations have to pay to defend against 
meritless litigation.20 Many are also involved in activism efforts and understand 
the value of litigation in controlling managerial behavior. In short, they stand 
alone in having the right financial incentives and organizational structure to 
tackle these problems. 
Advocating for procedural reform would be a new form of activism for 
institutional investors, but they would not need to embark on it alone. Indeed, 
although shareholders can technically amend corporate bylaws on their own,21 
the dispersed ownership at most public companies makes doing so extremely 
difficult.22 Instead, institutional investors should partner with corporate boards 
and other relevant stakeholders to draft procedural rules that are then 
incorporated into a corporation’s bylaws. This approach circumvents many of 
 
Delaware corporations began to experiment with so-called ‘private-ordering solutions’ to 
escape the[] abusive practices” in shareholder litigation, including specifically forum 
selection bylaws and fee-shifting bylaws). 
20 See, e.g., Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 494 
(2016) (“What is special about shareholder litigation––and differentiates it from consumer 
litigation––is that in some sense, shareholders are always on both sides of the 
litigation. . . . One consequence of this feature is that shareholders may benefit from some 
limitations on shareholder litigation.”). 
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (“After a corporation other than a nonstock 
corporation has received any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal 
bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote.”). 
22 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 
106 CAL. L. REV. 373, 377 (2018) (“Within the context of the New Governance, the board’s 
power to adopt and amend bylaw provisions may, for a variety of reasons, be greater than the 
shareholders’ power to do so.”). 
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the practical difficulties of a shareholder-led approach, while also addressing the 
potential biases of other constituencies. In short, institutional investors are 
uniquely positioned to be thought leaders in this area, investing in a new 
approach to corporate procedure. 
This path to reform would help solve the problems in shareholder litigation, 
but it does raise complex legal questions regarding the authority of shareholders 
and corporate boards. This authority likely depends on whether the lawsuit is 
filed under state or federal law. Under state law, which governs nearly all 
shareholder derivative suits and many merger class actions, corporations likely 
have broad power to rewrite procedural rules. Delaware, in particular, is quite 
accommodating of private ordering in this area.23 Under federal law, which 
governs securities class actions, however, there is less flexibility to change these 
rules.24 This Article is thus intended as a thought experiment, exploring the 
possibilities of procedural private ordering, while recognizing that, under current 
state and federal law, corporations may not have the freedom to adopt every 
variant of these rules. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the current crisis in 
shareholder litigation as well as the problems that gave rise to this crisis. Part II 
explains how procedure can address these problems, describing both why 
procedural reform is the right approach and exploring specific procedural 
solutions. Part III explores why institutional investors are the right group to take 
the lead in developing these new procedures. The time has come for institutional 
investors to bring their stake in corporate America to bear in rewriting corporate 
procedure. 
I. THE FAILURE OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
Shareholder litigation is a key weapon in the law’s arsenal to control 
managerial agency costs. Corporate law has traditionally given shareholders 
only three avenues to control agency costs: they can vote on select corporate 
decisions,  sell their stock, and sue the corporation and its managers for legal 
violations.25 While the first two rights remain relatively strong,26 the right to sue 
 
23 See infra Section III.C. 
24 See infra Section III.C. 
25 See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: 
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216 
(1999) (“Shareholders have only a limited role: They can vote, sell, or sue.”). 
26 This does not mean that the right to vote and the right to sell are perfect, however, as 
many scholars have noted. See, e.g., David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, 
Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 174 (2015) 
(“Like many instances of voting by a dispersed base, shareholder voting is subject to free-
rider problems because any individual shareholder receives only a small fraction of the benefit 
from casting a correct vote, but it bears the full cost of researching matters subject to vote.”); 
Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 384 
(2004) (explaining that while “opportunistic behavior in public corporations may be 
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has come under increasing criticism. This Part first explains the widespread 
problems with shareholder litigation before turning to the economic and 
institutional incentives that explain these problems. 
A. How It Failed 
The world of shareholder litigation is diverse, offering an array of options to 
hold corporations and their managers accountable for misdeeds. The focus here 
is on the three main litigation options under state and federal law. First, under 
state law, shareholders can file a class action in connection with a merger or 
acquisition if they believe that the merger price was too low or the merger 
disclosures were inadequate.27 Second, also under state law,28 shareholders can 
file a derivative suit if the corporation was directly hurt by its directors’ or 
officers’ breach of fiduciary duty.29 Finally, under federal law, shareholders can 
file a securities class action to challenge a corporation’s misstatements to the 
market.30 As this Section explains, these three types of lawsuits have each 
experienced a high proportion of low-value settlements, although these 
settlements look different in the three different areas. 
1. Merger Class Actions 
By almost any measure, merger class actions are in disarray. Over the last ten 
years, the number of suits challenging mergers and acquisitions skyrocketed. In 
2007, shareholders challenged forty-four percent of large mergers and 
acquisitions in court.31 By 2014, the percentage had increased to ninety-three 
 
constrained by the market; by definition, close corporations lack a market, and therefore lack 
this monitor” (footnote omitted)). 
27 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Today, 
the public announcement of virtually every transaction involving the acquisition of a public 
corporation provokes a flurry of class action lawsuits alleging that the target’s directors 
breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the corporation for an unfair price.”). 
28 In rare instances, shareholders can bring federal claims derivatively, but derivative suits 
more commonly include state claims. See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1774 (“[M]ore than 30 
percent of the derivative complaints filed on behalf of public companies alleged a claim under 
the federal securities laws, under either section 10(b) or 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.”). 
29 See Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Recognizing, however, 
that directors and officers of a corporation may not hold themselves accountable to the 
corporation for their own wrongdoing, courts of equity have created an ingenious device to 
police the activities of corporate fiduciaries: the shareholder’s derivative suit.”). 
30 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2401 (2014) (holding 
that investors can recover damages in a private securities class action “if they prove that they 
relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation in deciding to buy or sell a company’s stock”). 
31 See RAVI SINHA, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING 
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION 1 
(2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involvin 
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percent.32 Whatever one may think of corporate directors, it is hard to imagine 
that they breach their fiduciary duties in nearly every significant merger and 
acquisition. 
This influx of litigation has harmed shareholders. Nearly all of these cases are 
dismissed or settle,33 and shareholders almost never receive any monetary 
consideration in these settlements. Instead, in eighty percent of these 
settlements, the primary consideration was additional disclosures about the 
merger.34 Although such disclosures could theoretically be beneficial, empirical 
research shows that they almost never change the outcome of the shareholder 
vote on the merger.35 If the information disclosed is truly material in informing 
shareholders about previously undisclosed problems with the merger, it should 
result in a smaller percentage of shareholders voting in favor of the merger.36 
The fact that this new information does not impact how shareholders vote 
strongly suggests that these settlements do not benefit shareholders.37 
As a result, these suits have faced a storm of criticism from nearly all of the 
players involved. The Delaware Court of Chancery acknowledged that “far too 
often such litigation serves no useful purpose for stockholders, . . . serv[ing] 
only to generate fees for certain lawyers.”38 Prominent plaintiffs’ attorneys Mark 
Lebovitch and Jeron van Kwawegen publicly acknowledged that the “real 
problem” results from “the percentage of these stockholder lawsuits that achieve 
little, if anything, for stockholders, while giving away overbroad liability 
releases for corporate defendants and paying both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
 
g-Acquisitions-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ET4-YPDU] (showing percentage of mergers 
and acquisition deals challenged by shareholders). 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 4 (“Unlike prior years, settlements in 2015 accounted for less than half of all 
litigation outcomes.”). 
34 See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING 
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2015), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review 
[https://perma.cc/HF8Y-PRWP] (“Similar to prior years, almost 80 percent of settlements 
reached in 2014 provided only additional disclosures. Just six settlements [out of 78] involved 
payments to shareholders.”). 
35 See Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 561 (“[D]isclosure-only settlements do 
not appear to affect shareholder voting in any way.”). 
36 See id. at 575-76 (“[I]t seems clear that for supplemental disclosures to be meaningful, 
they must have a negative impact on shareholder voting in favor of the merger.”). 
37 Despite this finding, however, disclosure-only settlements are still profitable for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, with median fees of $500,000 in 2013. See OLGA KOUMRIAN, 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SETTLEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION 3 (2014), https://www.corner 
stone.com/Publications/Reports/Settlements-of-M-and-A-Shareholder-Litigation [https://per 
ma.cc/X3D3-9BBZ]. 
38 In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 892 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
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lawyers.”39 Other commentators stated that these suits represent a “transaction 
tax,”40 “clogging the courts and increasing transaction costs for no reason.”41 Far 
from being an effective tool for constraining managerial agency costs, merger 
class actions serve as an example of a litigation failure. 
2. Derivative Suits 
While the problems in merger litigation have increased exponentially over the 
past several years, similar problems have plagued derivative suits for decades.42 
The earliest study of derivative suits was conducted in New York in 1944.43 This 
study concluded that the “great preponderance” of derivative suits were 
“unfounded and speculative.”44 More recent studies have reached similar 
conclusions, with one calling derivative suits a “weak, if not ineffective, 
instrument of corporate governance”45 and another noting the “problematic role 
that these suits continue to play in corporate law.”46  
The reason for this criticism is nearly identical to the reason for the criticism 
of merger litigation—both types of suits rarely end with monetary settlements. 
While disclosure-only settlements are common in merger cases, derivative suits 
frequently end with the plaintiff corporation agreeing to make changes to its 
corporate governance practices in exchange for dismissal of the suit.47 In theory, 
like the disclosure-only settlements in merger litigation, these settlements could 
be valuable for corporations and their shareholders, but the reality is much more 
bleak. Corporations frequently agree to very modest reforms that bear little 
connection to the allegations in the complaint and are unlikely to enhance 
shareholder value.48 Although there are bright spots among this criticism,49 the 
 
39 Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 14, at 494. 
40 Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Transaction Tax: The New Cost of Doing 
Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 56-59 (2014). 
41 Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 591. 
42 See Jessica Erickson, The (Un)Changing Derivative Suit, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 58, 66 (Sean Griffith et al. eds., 2018) (“[T]he 
more fundamental problem of derivative suits ending with low-value settlements that do not 
benefit corporations or their shareholders has been a persistent problem for many decades.”). 
43 See FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE 
SUITS (1944). 
44 Id. at 9. 
45 See Romano, supra note 3, at 84. 
46 See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1755. 
47 See id. at 1754 (“[S]hareholder derivative suits more commonly end with the parties 
agreeing to corporate governance settlements.”). 
48 See id. at 1755 (“[C]orporate governance settlements often fail to live up to their 
potential because they include reforms that are unlikely to benefit corporations or their 
shareholders.”). 
49 See id. at 1758-59 (explaining how derivative suits filed in connection with backdating 
of stock options end with more favorable settlements for plaintiff corporations than derivative 
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empirical record demonstrates that derivative suits share many of the same 
problems that plague merger litigation. 
These suits also reward attorneys in much the same way. As with merger 
litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to fees from the corporation if the case 
confers a benefit on the represented parties, even if the relief is non-monetary.50 
Again, in theory, this rule makes sense—if the case confers a benefit on the 
corporation, the attorneys should be compensated, regardless of the precise 
nature of the relief. In practice, however, courts do little to ensure that the relief 
is in fact meaningful to the corporation or the class.51 As one commentator has 
stated, the ultimate result is that “attorneys now churn a mass of filings and 
settlements,” resulting in “overcompensation of attorneys (on both sides) and 
systematic under-compensation of the plaintiff class.”52 
3. Securities Class Actions 
On their face, securities class actions look quite different from merger class 
actions and derivative suits. First, and perhaps most notably, securities class 
actions rarely end with nonmonetary settlements.53 In fact, in 2017 the median 
settlement in securities class actions was $5 million, and it is not unusual for 
settlements to exceed $100 million.54 Second, unlike both merger class actions 
and derivative suits, securities class actions have received their fair share of 
major legislative attention. In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), overhauling the law governing securities 
 
suits with other types of allegations); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public 
and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749, 1762 (2004) 
(reviewing derivative suits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery and concluding that 
“[c]ontrary to earlier studies, we do not find evidence that these cases are ‘strike suits’ yielding 
little benefit”). 
50 See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation 
by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2015) (discussing corporate 
benefit doctrine’s requirements). 
51 See id. at 5 (“This analysis reveals courts’ current application of the corporate benefit 
doctrine as the principal enabler of the systemic overcompensation of lawyers and under-
compensation of plaintiffs.”). 
52 See id. at 2. 
53 This trend may be changing. The recent crackdown on merger litigation in state court 
has prompted many plaintiffs’ attorneys to repackage their claims as securities class actions 
with the hope that the nonmonetary settlements rejected in state court will pass muster in 
federal court. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 
VAND. L. REV 603, 633 (2018) (“Many of the same plaintiffs’ law firms that file deal litigation 
also are major players in bringing derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions.”). 
54 See LAARNI T. BULAN,  ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE 
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class actions.55 The PSLRA imposed new procedural hurdles and made the 
substantive law more stringent in a variety of ways. As a result, it is now far 
more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in these suits. 
Digging into the data, however, the PSLRA did not solve all of the problems 
in securities class actions. First, the PSLRA did not eliminate nuisance suits. 
More than a quarter of the settlements in securities class actions are for less than 
two million dollars—one commonly used cutoff for nuisance settlements in this 
area.56 Second, there is a longstanding concern among scholars that the PSLRA 
may bar many meritorious claims. The PSLRA includes heightened pleading 
standards that require courts to dismiss any complaint that does not allege facts 
creating a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud.57 
This standard is extremely difficult to meet without prior hard evidence of fraud, 
such as a restatement or Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
investigation.58 As a result, the PSLRA made it harder for shareholders to file 
both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims alike. 
Additionally, the PSLRA led to an array of new ethical challenges. It created 
a presumption that the lead plaintiff should be the shareholder applicant with the 
largest financial stake in the litigation.59 Congress added this presumption to 
enhance the role of institutional investors in these suits, with the hope that these 
investors would both better screen cases and negotiate lower fees with class 
counsel.60 In practice, however, the institutional investors who serve as lead 
plaintiffs are often public pension funds, which are typically controlled by 
political officials.61 As a result, the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provisions created an 
incentive for law firms to make campaign contributions to these officials to 
 
55 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
56 BULAN, RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 5. 
57 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
58 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 601 (2007) (discussing PSLRA’s high 
pleading standard). 
59 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(l)(bb) (“[T]he court shall adopt a presumption that the 
most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this chapter is the person or group 
of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the 
relief sought by the class . . . .”). 
60 See Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or 
“Look What’s Happened to My Baby,” 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 547, 552-53 (2008) 
(“[I]nstitutional investors that have sought appointment as lead plaintiff generally have 
negotiated fee arrangements with the law firms . . . for percentage fees far lower than had 
been the norm prior to passage of the PSLRA. Many institutional lead plaintiffs also have 
actively monitored class actions in which they have served as lead plaintiff . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
61 See id. at 552 (stating most lead plaintiff institutional investors are public or union 
pension funds). 
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secure their appointment as class counsel.62 Empirical studies demonstrate that 
the firms that make these contributions receive higher attorneys’ fees, suggesting 
that pension funds may negotiate less over fees if campaign contributions are on 
the line.63 
Stepping back, the data reveals that all three types of shareholder lawsuits—
merger litigation, derivative suits, and securities class actions—frequently end 
with low-value settlements that offer little benefit to shareholders. As a result of 
Congress’s efforts to crack down on meritless claims in the PSLRA, securities 
class actions perform slightly better than their state law counterparts, but these 
efforts led to new, unanticipated problems. In the end, if shareholder litigation 
is supposed to be the cornerstone of the law’s efforts to constrain corporate 
misconduct, it is falling far short of this goal. 
B. Why It Failed 
At first glance, this state of affairs is perplexing. Why do shareholders bother 
to file lawsuits that they are willing to settle for so little? And, if these claims do 
not have merit, why are defendants so willing to settle them? The answer lies in 
the unique incentives of shareholder litigation. As this Section explains, these 
suits suffer from significant agency costs because many shareholder plaintiffs 
do not have a large enough financial stake in the litigation to closely monitor 
their attorney. Additionally, the costs of these suits fall disproportionately on 
defendants, which makes them willing to settle even those claims they think they 
can win. These dynamics explain the seemingly counterintuitive litigation 
decisions that plague this area. 
1. Agency Costs  
A foundational principle of the American litigation system is that clients, not 
their attorneys, should make major litigation decisions.64 Shareholder litigation 
is an exception to this principle because these lawsuits are not controlled by the 
real parties in interest. Instead, these suits are controlled by a shareholder 
 
62 See Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & A. C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay to 
Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 651 (2011) (“The political 
influence over these funds raises the question of whether law firms are making campaign 
contributions to politicians to enhance their chances of being selected to represent the 
funds.”). 
63 See id. (“State pension funds whose managers have received campaign contributions . . . 
appear to be less vigorous in negotiating attorney fees.”); see also Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, 
Paying-to-Play in Securities Class Actions: A Look at Lawyers’ Campaign Contributions, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1725, 1750 (2009) (“[D]ata confirms that plaintiff’s law firms are contributing 
to the pension funds that select them as counsel.”). 
64 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677 (1986) (“In theory, a fundamental premise of American legal ethics 
is that clients, not their attorneys, should define litigation objectives.”). 
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representative, who acts on behalf of the shareholder class in merger and 
securities class actions and on behalf of the plaintiff corporation in a derivative 
suit.65 The representative nature of these suits means that the real parties in 
interest are not directly involved in the litigation and are therefore limited in 
their ability to monitor it. 
Corporate law attempts to solve this problem by entrusting shareholder 
plaintiffs to monitor the lawsuits on behalf of the larger shareholder class.66 Yet 
these shareholders often do not own a large enough stake in the corporation to 
justify the costs of closely monitoring the litigation.67 A shareholder with only 
one hundred dollars at stake in the litigation will not take the time to delve into 
the details to ensure that the attorneys are acting in the best interests of the class.  
This reduced monitoring impacts shareholder lawsuits in two related ways. 
First, on the front end, attorneys can file lawsuits that may not be in their clients’ 
best interests.68 These lawsuits may be financially lucrative for the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, even though they do not ultimately benefit the shareholders or the 
plaintiff corporation. Second, on the back end, if shareholders are not monitoring 
the litigation, it opens the door for attorneys to seek a higher fee.69 Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys may be able to structure a settlement that maximizes their return, even 
if it does not maximize the return to shareholders. 
These agency costs explain many of the problems described above, starting 
with the prevalence of nonmonetary settlements in merger and derivative suits. 
Shareholders receive little benefit from these settlements, as empirical studies 
have documented,70 yet they are remarkably lucrative for plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
 
65 In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 117 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“A 
shareholder plaintiff in a derivative suit alleges claims in the right of the corporation rather 
than directly . . . .”); In re Countrywide Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 3464-VCN, 2009 WL 
846019, at *13-15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2009) (presenting framework to ensure that the 
shareholder plaintiff is an adequate representative of shareholder class in a merger class 
action). 
66 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in 
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 49 (1985). 
67 See id. 
68 See Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 20-21. 
69 Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and 
Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 389 (1994) (arguing that interests of 
shareholder plaintiffs and their attorneys “may conflict since the fee award comes out of the 
damage recovery so that any increase in the fee award necessarily leads to a decrease in 
plaintiffs’ recovery”). 
70 See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1830 (“As my study reveals, . . . shareholders agree to 
settle shareholder derivative suits in exchange for corporate governance reforms that are often 
untested and/or patently unhelpful for both the corporations and their sharholders.”); Romano, 
supra note 3, at 63 (“While it is impossible to value the benefits from structural settlements 
with any precision, the gains seem inconsequential.”). 
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with six-figure fee awards as the norm.71 The financial incentives favor these 
types of settlements because plaintiffs’ attorneys profit from them and 
shareholder plaintiffs do not have enough of a financial stake in the litigation to 
make it worth their while to protest.  
Agency costs also help explain the pervasiveness of other types of nuisance 
settlements. Low-dollar settlements, which are seen in a sizable minority of 
securities class actions, benefit plaintiffs’ attorneys, often at the expense of their 
shareholder clients. As many scholars have explained, shareholders are harmed 
by nuisance settlements because they often remain an investor in the target 
corporation. As a result, any money they receive in the settlement comes out of 
their investment in the corporation, creating a circularity problem that has been 
well documented in corporate scholarship.72 If these suits deter future 
misconduct by corporate managers, the suits may benefit shareholders despite 
this circularity, but meritless claims have little, if any, deterrent effect.73 As a 
result, suits that are filed for their nuisance value benefit attorneys, but they are 
unlikely to benefit shareholders. As Professor John Coffee, Jr. stated, the 
dynamic of “high agency costs make plaintiff’s attorneys independent 
entrepreneurs.”74 
Agency costs, however, are only one piece of the puzzle. They explain why 
shareholder representatives do not closely monitor these cases, but not why 
defendants agree to settle them. As we will see, cost asymmetries fill in this part 
of the story. 
2. Cost Asymmetries 
The legal system provides multiple opportunities for defendants to contest 
meritless claims, from motions to dismiss, to summary judgment, and to trial.75 
These opportunities only work, however, if the parties face the right economic 
 
71 See KOUMRIAN, supra note 37, at 3 (reporting average fee request of $500,000 in merger 
cases in 2013 ending in disclosure-only settlements); Erickson, supra note 3, at 1806 (finding 
$460,000 is median fee award in derivative suits ending with corporate governance 
settlement). 
72 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006) (describing “a 
basic circularity underlying the securities class action: When damages are imposed on the 
corporation, they essentially fall on diversified shareholders, thereby producing mainly 
pocket-shifting wealth transfers among shareholders”); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the 
Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 334 (describing 
circularity problem as “private securities litigation [being] socially wasteful because it merely 
transfers funds from one set of shareholders to another”). 
73 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 72, at 1535-36 (“As presently constituted, securities class 
actions produce wealth transfers among shareholders that neither compensate nor deter.”). 
74 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 64, at 724. 
75 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56 (permitting defendant to submit motion to dismiss and 
motion for summary judgment in civil proceedings). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160 
  
1382 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1367 
 
incentives.  In the typical civil lawsuit, the parties face roughly equivalent costs 
and therefore roughly equivalent incentives to litigate.76 In shareholder 
litigation, however, the defendants’ costs are typically far greater than the 
plaintiffs’ costs, creating a cost asymmetry between the two sides of the 
litigation.77 It costs relatively little for attorneys to file many of these cases. The 
complaints tend to be fairly similar, and they are often filed within hours of the 
merger announcement.78 Additionally, almost all discovery material is in the 
hands of the defendants.79  
Given that each side pays its own discovery costs, this disparity means that 
the corporation’s costs are significantly higher than the plaintiffs’ costs. As a 
result, even if a corporation does not think that the suit has merit, it will rationally 
pay to settle the case rather than incur the high costs of discovery. Indeed, as one 
New York judge recently stated, “No one, not even plaintiffs, disputes this 
reality [that] [t]he defendant corporation’s cost-benefit calculus almost always 
leads the company to settle.”80 
Reinforcing these incentives is the fact that many of these cases pose 
significant downside risks to defendants that are not commensurate with the 
risks felt by plaintiffs. In merger litigation, for example, the plaintiff will often 
seek to enjoin the merger, which would create significant costs for the defendant 
corporation.81 Potential damages in securities class actions can easily rise to 
hundreds of millions of dollars, which means that these suits can become “bet 
 
76 See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 9, at 1-2 (“For the closed cases included in the sample, 
the median cost, including attorney fees, was $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for 
defendants.”). 
77 See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 8, at 71-72, 75-76 (discussing cost asymmetries in merger 
and securities class actions); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The 
Importance of Being Dismissive: The Efficiency Role of Pleading Stage Evaluation of 
Shareholder Litigation, 42 J. CORP. L. 597, 602-03 (2017) (explaining that “the one-sided 
threat of unchecked discovery costs becomes a source of leverage for extracting settlement 
payments without regard to the merits of the litigation” (footnote omitted)). 
78 See, e.g., Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the 
Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155 (2011) (discussing how 
plaintiffs’ attorneys “quickly file cookie-cutter complaints”). 
79 See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 8, at 71-72, 75-76 (“[W]hile the plaintiff may only have 
to locate a few pages from his investment records, the defendant will have to spend millions 
of dollars to conduct a sweeping search of its own documents.”). 
80 See City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014, 2015 WL 93894, at *14 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Jan. 7, 2015), rev’d, 43 N.Y.S.3d 21 (2016). 
81 See William Savitt, Leave Merger Disclosure Litigation Where It Belongs, 93 TEX. L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 173, 177 (2015) (“Disclosure claims thus offer shareholder plaintiffs a route 
to seek expedited discovery and a preliminary injunction to block the deal, both of which can 
in turn create leverage to force a settlement.”); see also In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 
129 A.3d 884, 892 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“In [merger] lawsuits, plaintiffs’ leverage is the threat of 
an injunction to prevent a transaction from closing. Faced with that threat, defendants are 
incentivized to settle quickly in order to mitigate the considerable expense of litigation and 
the distraction it entails . . . .”). 
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the company” lawsuits.82 In such low-probability suits involving the potential 
for large verdicts, defendants are often risk-averse.83 As a result, they are often 
willing to settle meritless claims to avoid delaying an important transaction or 
risking the company’s financial stability.84 
Nonmonetary settlements are an easy way for defendants to avoid these 
financial risks. Most settlements outside of corporate law are zero-sum85—every 
dollar that the plaintiff recovers comes out of the defendant’s pocket.86 As a 
result, defendants have an incentive to fight claims they think they can win. 
Nonmonetary settlements change this analysis. If the defendant can get rid of 
the case by offering nonmonetary relief, such as additional disclosures about a 
merger or modest corporate governance reforms, then it has a reduced incentive 
to fight meritless claims.87 The same calculus exists in securities class actions, 
albeit in a slightly different way. In these cases, defendants often do not have the 
option of nonmonetary settlements, but they can still enter into a monetary 
settlement at a fairly low cost. Across the board, therefore, defendants make the 
rational cost-benefit calculation that it is cheaper to settle the case and pay the 
plaintiff’s fees than go through discovery and then get the case dismissed.  
Defendants are not necessarily victims in this narrative. In shareholder 
lawsuits, defendants walk away with a release from liability at a bargain price. 
Settlements are a negotiation in which plaintiffs get money or other 
consideration and defendants get a binding promise that they will not face 
liability in a related suit in the future. In settlements involving nonmonetary or 
 
82 See Charles Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities 
Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 588 (2000) (“When it comes to securities class action 
litigation, there are substantial reasons to believe that defendants are strongly risk-averse, 
pessimistic, and have asymmetric stakes. It should not be surprising, therefore, that they will 
seek to settle even cases that they view as having only a small chance of success.”); see also 
Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Many corporate 
executives are unwilling to bet their company that they are in the right in big-stakes litigation, 
and a grant of class status can propel the stakes of a case into the stratosphere.”). 
83 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 163, 168 (2000) (explaining theory that defendants will be risk-averse with 
respect to low probability losses, while plaintiffs will be risk-seeking in same context); Mark 
Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 696-97 (2011) (stating that “many claim 
defendants are more risk averse than plaintiffs, particularly in low probability suits” and “[i]f 
true, even the small threat of a very large jury verdict, particularly in class cases, may lead 
defendants to settle weak class claims for more than they are objectively worth”). 
84 See Moller, supra note 83, at 697. 
85 Congress has eliminated non-monetary settlements in many other areas of law. See, e.g., 
28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012) (eliminating coupon settlements). 
86 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement 
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 652 (1976) (“Furthermore, when the purpose of 
negotiation is dispute-settlement, the process tends to be a zero-sum game (that is, a contest 
in which the winner’s gains are exactly balanced by the loser’s losses).”). 
87 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 66, at 25 (“Normally, in litigation, the winning side’s 
recovery equals the losing side’s losses, much as in poker. But in [a non-monetary settlement], 
an absent third party, the corporation, bears the expenses of both sides.”). 
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other inconsequential relief, the defendants’ release from liability may be far 
more valuable than anything they agree to give the plaintiffs. As a result, the 
typical pattern in these suits—a hastily-filed complaint, minimal investigation 
by the plaintiff’s attorney, and a nonmonetary settlement—benefits the lawyers 
on both sides of the suit, as well as the defendants. The only group that does not 
benefit is shareholders, who both pay for the litigation and give up any later right 
to sue if they discover a problem with the underlying transaction or disclosures 
in the future. 
Together, these points present a bleak image of shareholder litigation. Merger 
and derivative suits rarely return meaningful value to shareholders. Securities 
class actions have a better batting average, but the PSLRA has created a 
substantial risk that many good cases are never filed, while some meritless cases 
still escape scrutiny. These outcomes are a direct result of agency costs and cost 
asymmetries. Shareholder plaintiffs are supposed to monitor their attorneys to 
ensure that these cases are litigated in the best interests of shareholders, but they 
often own too little stock to perform this monitoring function effectively. And 
corporations and their managers, who should be defending against these claims, 
find it cheaper to enter into low-value settlements and get broad releases. As a 
result, these suits do not perform a critical role in policing corporate managers. 
II. THE PROMISE OF PROCEDURE 
The field of civil procedure offers a solution to the longstanding problems in 
shareholder litigation. This Part first explores why procedure is the right 
solution, before discussing specific procedures to address the problems 
introduced in Part I. As discussed below, together these procedures have the 
potential to revive the promise of shareholder litigation. This analysis sets the 
stage for an examination in Part III as to why institutional shareholders are the 
right group to take the lead in adopting these new procedural reforms. 
A. Why Procedure? 
When it comes to litigation reform, lawmakers have different tools at their 
disposal. They can reform the substantive law, the procedures that govern this 
substantive law, or the remedies available to plaintiffs. This Section addresses 
why procedural reform is the right solution to the specific problems in corporate 
litigation. It then addresses how including new procedures in corporate bylaws 
or charters would have the unappreciated benefit of making these procedures 
portable, which would help address the multijurisdictional challenges in these 
suits. 
1. Procedure Versus Substance 
It is not immediately obvious why corporations should turn to procedure. 
Maybe instead of focusing on procedural reform, investors should rewrite the 
substantive rules that apply in these cases. They could, for example, make the 
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business judgment rule even more stringent. Or they could make it more difficult 
for shareholders to prevail in claims alleging waste or lack of oversight. 
The problem with this approach is that the substantive law already makes it 
extremely difficult to bring fiduciary duty and securities claims. It is nearly 
impossible to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule—the bedrock 
of substantive fiduciary duty law.88 It is harder still to prove a claim that the 
board did not exercise proper oversight over the corporation or engage in 
corporate waste.89 Even self-dealing claims, which are typically reviewed under 
the more stringent entire fairness standard, rarely succeed. 
The problem in corporate law, in other words, is not that the substantive law 
is too lax. The problem is that these claims are profitable even though they are 
unlikely to succeed.90 Changing the substantive law will not solve these 
problems. Most defendants would win under the existing substantive law, if they 
chose to fight the claims. Nevertheless, they choose to settle, rather than take 
these cases to trial, because agency costs and cost asymmetries make it 
unprofitable to defend against these claims, even if they believe they would win. 
Making the law more stringent would not change this calculus. Instead of 
tougher substantive laws, the legal system needs a better way to sort the good 
cases from the bad. Such sorting is exactly what procedural rules are supposed 
to do.91 Procedure sorts cases at all stages of the litigation process, from motions 
to dismiss to motions for class certification and summary judgment. 
Yet traditional procedural rules are inadequate for the unique problems in 
shareholder litigation. Procedure is typically transsubstantive, which means that 
the same procedural rules apply in all civil cases.92 Most cases, however, do not 
suffer from the agency costs and cost asymmetries that cause such problems in 
shareholder litigation. In a typical civil case, the plaintiff receives the lion’s 
share of any recovery, which gives the plaintiff a strong economic interest to 
monitor her attorney. In addition, most cases involve discovery costs that are 
 
88 Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (describing business 
judgment rule as “powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the directors”). 
89 Cf. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(describing an oversight claim as “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon 
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment”). 
90 See supra Section I.B (discussing economics of claims that are unlikely to actually 
prevail but nonetheless lead to monetary settlement). 
91 See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 577 (1997) 
(“The goal of any regulatory scheme, whether it involves strict pleading, penalties or judicial 
screening, is, loosely stated, to minimize the problems of frivolous litigation without creating 
too many new problems along the way.”); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second 
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990) (discussing “screening 
function” of summary judgment rules). 
92 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil 
Procedure, 23 Cᴀʀᴅᴏᴢᴏ L. Rᴇᴠ. 1865, 1888 (2002) (describing transsubstantive procedural 
rules as “deliberate design choices that lie at the core of the achievement of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure”). 
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relatively minor and fall equally on both sides.93 In other words, transsubstantive 
procedural rules do little to address agency costs and cost asymmetries because 
these problems are not present in any significant way in most civil cases. 
Shareholder litigation is different, for all of the reasons set out in Part I. As a 
result, it makes sense to have special procedural rules that apply in this special 
category of cases. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that procedure is not an entirely new 
solution to the problems in shareholder litigation. Prior reform efforts by states 
and legal reform groups have also proposed procedural changes. In shareholder 
derivative suits in particular, states impose a demand requirement on 
shareholders prior to filing suit,94 and they have created a complex set of rules 
permitting plaintiff corporations to form a special litigation committee that can 
move to dismiss a derivative suit.95 Some states also impose a bond requirement 
on shareholders seeking to file a derivative suit.96 The American Law Institute 
similarly spent years debating the appropriate procedural rules to apply in these 
cases, ultimately recommending a universal demand requirement along with 
other procedural hurdles.97 
These procedures, however, were not designed to address the specific 
problems—agency costs and cost asymmetries—in shareholder litigation. 
Instead, they were primarily designed to give corporate boards more influence 
over these suits. For the reasons discussed below in Part III, this approach has 
been unsuccessful as a screening mechanism because corporate boards have a 
structural bias that prevents them from impartially reviewing such claims.98 
Bond requirements are similarly undesirable because they make it more difficult 
for all plaintiffs to file these claims, regardless of the underlying merits of the 
 
93 Multiple studies have found that the cost of discovery in most cases is fairly minimal. 
For example, a study by the Federal Judicial Center found that the median discovery costs for 
plaintiffs were $15,000, while the median discovery costs for defendants in these same cases 
were $20,000. These costs are far lower than the lore that dominates policy debates would 
suggest. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
94 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(A); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. Ch. 1984) 
(“[D]emand can only be excused where facts are alleged with particularity which create a 
reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was entitled to the protections of the business 
judgment rule.”). 
95 See 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8:25 (AM. BAR FOUND. Supp. 2002). 
96 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2011). 
97 See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative 
Litigation: The Ali Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1341-42 (1993) (“Since 1978, the 
Corporate Governance Project of the American Law Institute (‘ALI’)—sometimes called the 
most elite group of lawyers in the United States—has labored over finding the appropriate 
balance between management and shareholder rights in derivative suits.”). 
98 See infra Section II.B.3; see also 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.02(c) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1994) (emphasizing that there is a consistent pattern among special litigation 
committees of dismissing the action as to all defendants). 
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claims.99 The legal system cannot indiscriminately throw new procedures at the 
specific problems in this area of law. Instead, legal reformers must step back and 
analyze the suite of procedural options more systematically to identify those that 
can more effectively address the specific challenges of shareholder lawsuits. 
Before doing so, however, it is necessary first to analyze where these new 
procedures will be included, a point that will impact the effectiveness of any 
new procedures. 
2. The Benefits of Portable Procedure 
When thinking about procedural reform, one may typically think about new 
rules adopted by legislatures or judges. Yet plenty of procedural reform happens 
through private ordering. The rise of arbitration, for example, occurred because 
contracting parties included arbitration clauses in their agreements. Contracting 
parties also routinely agree to change how they will pay for any future litigation 
expenses. And they can agree to waive their right to appeal,100 their right to a 
jury trial,101 and their right to file a class action.102 In other words, the procedural 
rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are often only default rules that 
parties are free to change through private agreement. 
Procedural private ordering, however, has been slow to come to corporate 
law. In 2010, the Delaware Court of Chancery first opened the door, albeit in a 
limited way. The court invited corporations that were concerned about litigating 
in multiple jurisdictions to include a forum selection provision in their governing 
documents.103 Following this invitation, several hundred companies adopted 
 
99 See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 100 
VA. L. REV. 261, 311 n.244 (2014) (“This bonding requirement is much less common today—
as judges came to believe that it would smother derivative claims. The cost of posting the 
bond, even before it is combined with the risk that the money might be lost, can be greater 
than the expected recovery to a small shareholder-claimant.”). 
100 See 2 AM. JUR. APPEAL AND ERROR § 204 (2010) (“Though there are a few cases to the 
contrary, the rule prevailing in the great majority of the jurisdictions is that an [appellate 
waiver] is valid and binding, and, when properly pleaded, will constitute a bar to proceedings 
taken in violation of the agreement.”). 
101 See, e.g., RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002) 
(“Although the right of trial by jury in civil actions is protected by the Seventh Amendment 
to the Constitution, that right, like other constitutional rights, may be waived by prior written 
agreement of the parties.”). 
102 See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (holding that the 
Federal Arbitration Act does not permit states to prohibit class action waivers in arbitration 
contracts). 
103 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of 
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and 
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with 
charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for  intra-entity disputes.”). 
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forum selection provisions in their bylaws.104 A smaller number of corporations 
adopted other procedural rules, but this trend is limited. It does show, however, 
that procedural reform in the corporate arena does not have to happen through 
formal, legislative action. Instead, it can occur on a company-by-company basis 
through amendments to corporate charters or bylaws.105 
This point matters because including new procedures in corporate charters or 
bylaws has the unappreciated benefit of making these procedures portable. To 
understand this point, one must understand the multijurisdictional nature of 
shareholder litigation. In January 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated 
that it would look far more closely at disclosure-only settlements, rejecting those 
that do not involve “plainly material” disclosures.106 Over the following year, 
the total number of merger cases across the country fell slightly,107 but a sizable 
percentage of the remaining cases moved outside of Delaware. In 2016, thirty-
four percent of merger cases were filed in Delaware; in 2017, that percentage 
dropped to nine percent.108 In short, Delaware tried to crack down on these cases, 
but as a result, it lost most of them.109 Past reform efforts have shown the 
portable nature of these claims to be one of the biggest challenges in reforming 
shareholder litigation. 
This observation reveals the drawbacks of including new procedures in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the state equivalents. Under the internal 
affairs doctrine,110 if a state adopts new substantive reforms to the law governing 
shareholder litigation, these reforms apply to all cases involving corporations 
incorporated in that state, regardless of where the case is filed.111 If, however, a 
state adopts new procedural reforms, such as greater scrutiny of settlements or 
heightened pleading requirements, these reforms do not apply in cases filed 
 
104 See Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum 
Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 33 (2015) (finding that, as of 
August 2014, 746 public companies had adopted these provisions). 
105 See infra notes 140-141. 
106 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
107 See Cain et al., supra note 53, at 608 (“In 2013, 91% of all completed deals were 
challenged in at least one lawsuit. That number declined to 73% in 2016 but rose to 85% in 
2017.”). 
108 See id. 
109 See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation 
in M&A Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1925, 1939 (2013) (“Weaker cases, however, are more 
likely to go elsewhere [outside of Delaware], in an effort to find a more hospitable home.”). 
110 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982) (discussing modern internal 
affairs doctrine). 
111 See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law Beyond State Borders: 
Reflections Upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1159 (2009) (“Extraterritoriality is an 
unavoidable consequence of the internal affairs doctrine.”); Verity Winship, Aligning Law 
and Forum: The Home Court Advantage, 81 TENN. L. REV. 1, 14, 22-23 (2013) (arguing that 
Erie “unbundles” state law and state forum and “dictates the use of substantive state law in 
diversity cases”). 
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outside the jurisdiction.112 In other words, fiduciary duties travel outside the 
state’s boundaries, while settlement rules and pleading requirements do not. 
As a result, although Delaware has announced that it will review disclosure-
only settlements more stringently, courts in other states are free to apply their 
own standards, even if the case involves corporations incorporated in 
Delaware.113 State choice-of-law rules accordingly allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
forum shop for more favorable procedural rules,114 seeking out courts that will 
use less scrutiny in reviewing their proposed settlements. These doctrines, 
however, do not apply to procedures included in corporate charters and bylaws. 
Parties are generally free to agree that different rules will govern their dispute,115 
and by and large, these agreements will trump a jurisdiction’s own procedural 
rules.116 When shareholders or board members adopt new rules to govern their 
disputes, these rules become the law in any future shareholder lawsuit.117 In sum, 
by including procedural rules in their charters or bylaws, corporations can make 
procedure portable. 
This portability could prove pivotal in the struggle over shareholder litigation. 
By including new procedural rules in their governing documents, corporations 
can prevent plaintiffs’ attorneys from forum shopping for more favorable 
procedures. Given that the substantive law in fiduciary duty cases is almost 
always the law of the state of incorporation, plaintiffs’ attorneys would face the 
 
112 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1971) 
(“[A] court under traditional and prevailing practice will apply its own state’s rules involving 
process, pleadings, joinder of parties, and the administration of the trial . . . .”). 
113 Several courts have declined to follow Trulia, applying their own state-specific 
standards for reviewing proposed settlements. See, e.g., Murphy v. Synergetics USA Inc., No. 
1511-CC00778 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2016) (approving disclosure-only settlement); In re 
Sigma-Aldrich Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 1422-CC09684 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2015) 
(same); Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 566 (App. Div. 2017) (holding 
that New York courts will apply New York law to review settlements in merger class actions, 
rather than Trulia standard from Delaware). 
114 When it comes to choice-of-law rules regarding substantive law, the internal affairs 
doctrine dictates that courts should apply the law of the state of incorporation. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“[T]he 
local law of the state of incorporation should be applied except in the extremely rare situation 
where a contrary result is required by the overriding interest of another state in having its rule 
applied.”). 
115 See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. 
PA. L. REV. 949, 951 (1994) (“Widespread approval by courts of party autonomy rules has 
made it more possible for commercial parties to avoid choice of law confusion.”). 
116 See Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 643, 672 (2015) (“Many of the normal rules of procedure thus become no more 
than default contractual rules, which the parties can extensively modify through 
negotiation.”). 
117 As discussed in Section III.C, infra, the law is not entirely clear regarding the limits of 
procedural innovations in charters and bylaws. Yet the likely interpretation of the law is that 
shareholders have tremendous flexibility to craft their own procedural rules just like they can 
create their own substantive rules. 
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same substantive and procedural rules regardless of where they file. This 
consistency would reduce the incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to forum shop, 
thus providing more effective means for corporations to address the agency costs 
and cost asymmetries in these cases. 
B. A New Procedural Toolkit 
There is no single procedure that will solve all of the problems with 
shareholder litigation. The field of civil procedure, however, does offer specific 
tools designed to reduce agency costs and cost asymmetries. This Section 
outlines procedural changes in shareholder litigation that could target both 
problems. Viewed as a whole, these proposals aim to help sort the good cases 
from the bad, ensuring that meritless cases are dismissed while meritorious cases 
continue. 
1. Tools to Control Agency Costs 
As discussed in Part I, many of the problems in shareholder litigation are 
caused by agency costs. Shareholders’ interests are not aligned with the interests 
of their attorneys, and most shareholder plaintiffs do not have a large enough 
stake in the case to ensure that the attorneys are putting the shareholders’ 
interests above their own. As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys can file cases and 
enter into settlements that do not benefit their shareholder clients. This Section 
discusses three procedural tools that can help address these agency costs: 
nonwaivable forum selection clauses, bans on nonmonetary settlements, and 
enhanced standing requirements. 
a. Nonwaivable Forum Selection Clauses 
Shareholders should consider incorporating forum selection clauses into 
corporate bylaws, specifying the forum in which future shareholder lawsuits 
must be litigated.118 These clauses help address agency costs in two ways. First, 
they curb multijurisdictional litigation and the problems that go along with it. 
As noted above, over the last several years, plaintiffs’ law firms have 
increasingly filed parallel claims in multiple jurisdictions.119 These 
multijurisdictional suits allow defendants to hold a reverse auction among the 
various plaintiffs’ attorneys to get the cheapest settlement price.120 Defense 
 
118 Delaware specifically amended its corporate code to permit these clauses, as long as 
the forum is Delaware. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019) (“The certificate of 
incorporation or the bylaws may require . . . that any or all internal corporate claims shall be 
brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State . . . .”). 
119 See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 16, at 5 (“Merger claims can be brought in three places: 
in the state of incorporation, in the headquarters state, or in federal court.”). 
120 See Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
467, 507 (“The most threatening consequence of multi-forum shareholder litigation is that it 
inhibits the ability of any plaintiff’s attorney to press for a tough bargain in settlement.”); 
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counsel can offer low settlement terms to an attorney in one jurisdiction with the 
implicit threat that if the attorney does not accept the terms, the defendant will 
settle with another attorney who will.121 Even if the first attorney thinks that the 
case is worth more than the settlement offer, it may well accept the settlement 
to avoid losing the lion’s share of the attorneys’ fees, which typically go to the 
firm that oversees the settlement. The defendant can then use the settlement as 
res judicata to dismiss parallel cases pending in other jurisdictions.122 Forum 
selection clauses have the potential to halt these efforts by bringing all litigation 
into a single forum.123 
Second, if shareholders choose the right forum, forum selection clauses 
should funnel the claims into a forum such as Delaware that is likely to provide 
greater oversight over these claims. As corporations experienced, as soon as one 
jurisdiction starts to crack down on shareholder suits, these suits move to a 
different jurisdiction where the judges are less likely to closely monitor them.124 
Forum selection clauses prohibit this type of forum shopping, allowing courts 
that want to crack down on litigation abuses to do so without worrying about 
driving the cases away. 
Unlike many of the other procedural reforms suggested in this Article, forum 
selection clauses are already on their way to becoming a procedural staple in 
corporate law. First proposed by the Delaware Court of Chancery in 2010, they 
are now commonplace, especially among corporations announcing a large 
merger or acquisition. These clauses, however, are typically adopted by boards 
of directors and give boards broad discretion to waive the clause.125 In theory, 
this discretion makes sense. While a corporation may generally want its 
shareholders’ suits to be litigated in a given jurisdiction, there may be times 
when it makes more sense for these suits to be litigated elsewhere. 
In practice, however, the mere possibility of waiver undercuts the 
effectiveness of these clauses. Once a company is sued, it has to decide whether 
to enforce the forum selection clause and fight the claims in its chosen forum 
(likely Delaware, where the claims will be closely scrutinized by the court) or 
simply enter into a cheap settlement and get rid of the claims. A rational 
company could easily decide that it is cheaper to go with the latter option, and 
 
Morris A. Ratner, Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. REV. 785, 799 (2017) (“Reverse auctions 
occurred when defendants pitted competing camps of plaintiffs’ counsel against each other, 
awarding the role of settlement class counsel to the lowest bidder.”). 
121 See Thomas, supra note 109, at 1936 (“Defendants may run a reverse auction, in which 
competing plaintiffs’ counsel offer to settle their suits at the lowest price.”). 
122 See Myers, supra note 120, at 507 (“[A] settlement with the plaintiff’s attorney in one 
forum generally precludes the claims asserted in another forum.”). 
123 See Ratner, supra note 120, at 854-55 (explaining how “the likelihood of reverse 
auctions in mass torts has been substantially reduced” as a result of procedures bringing these 
cases into a single jurisdiction with a clear leadership structure). 
124 See supra Section II.A.2. 
125 See Romano & Sanga, supra note 104, at 35. 
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plaintiffs’ firms deciding whether to sue know this. As a result, the possibility 
of waiver revives the incentives to file meritless claims. Shareholders crafting 
these clauses should therefore consider eliminating the broad discretion that 
boards currently have to waive these clauses. 
Even with this change, however, forum selection clauses cannot solve the 
problems in shareholder litigation on their own. These clauses only prevent 
forum shopping in shareholder lawsuits filed under state law. They cannot 
control shareholder lawsuits filed under federal law because federal law provides 
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over these suits. Increasingly, as 
state courts have cracked down on merger cases, law firms have started to 
package their allegations as securities class actions instead, avoiding state courts 
altogether.126 As a result, forum selection clauses are an important tool in the 
procedural toolbox, but they cannot fix the problems in these suits by 
themselves. 
b. Bans on Nonmonetary Settlements 
An additional option to control agency costs in shareholder litigation is to ban 
nonmonetary settlements. As discussed in Part I, both derivative suits and 
merger suits frequently end with settlements in which the shareholders and/or 
the plaintiff corporation receive no money or other financial consideration. 
Instead, in derivative suits, the plaintiff corporation often agrees to make minor 
changes to its corporate governance practices, while in merger cases, the 
defendant corporation agrees to make additional disclosures about the merger. 
Empirical evidence suggests that such nonmonetary consideration offers little 
benefit for shareholders.127 
One option then is for shareholders to prohibit corporations from entering into 
these settlements. Similarly, as Professor Sean Griffith recently suggested, 
shareholders could prohibit the corporation from paying the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
fees in these settlements.128 As Griffith notes, a corporation faces different 
incentives before and after it is sued.129 After a corporation is sued, it makes 
economic sense for the corporation to agree to a nonmonetary settlement. These 
 
126 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2017 MIDYEAR 
ASSESSMENT 3 (2017), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-
Action-Filings-2017-Midyear-Assessment [https://perma.cc/2P46-4ZDC] (“The Delaware 
Court of Chancery’s rejection of a disclosure-only settlement in Trulia in January 2016 seems 
to have caused a shift of merger objection lawsuits from state to federal court.”). 
127 See Erickson, supra note 3, at 1755 (“[C]orporate governance settlements often fail to 
live up to their potential because they include reforms that are unlikely to benefit corporations 
or their shareholders.”); Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 561 (finding that 
“disclosure-only settlements do not appear to affect shareholder voting in any way”). 
128 See Griffith, supra note 16, at 1 (detailing benefits of “No Pay” provisions in 
corporations’ charters or bylaws). 
129 Id. at 14 (describing “disconnect in defense side incentives ex ante and ex post” in 
context of forum selection provisions). 
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settlements are cheap for the corporation, at least compared to defending against 
the claims. Before the corporation has been sued, however, a corporation is 
better off surrendering this settlement option, because doing so will reduce the 
likelihood that the corporation will be sued in the first place.130 
The ex post incentives make corporations easy targets because plaintiffs’ 
attorneys know that it is cheaper for them to settle the claims with non-monetary 
settlements than to litigate the claims. If this option is off the table, and the 
corporation has to pay actual money to settle the suit, it may well decide to fight 
instead, reducing the incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to sue the company in 
the first instance. In short, ex post corporations want to enter into nonmonetary 
settlements, but ex ante, the same corporations may well rationally surrender 
their right to do so. 
Although Griffith’s proposal focuses on merger litigation, shareholders could 
extend it to derivative suits as well. Just as in merger suits, corporations agree to 
nonmonetary settlements in derivative suits because these settlements are a 
relatively inexpensive way to get rid of individual suits. If this option were off 
the table, however, corporations would have to decide whether to demand 
money from the defendants or go to trial. To the extent that some corporations 
would choose to fight frivolous claims rather than settle them, it should reduce 
the incentive to file these claims. 
As with forum selection clauses, this proposal is unlikely to completely solve 
the agency cost problems in shareholder litigation. Nonmonetary settlements are 
not common in securities class actions,131 and yet there are still nuisance 
settlements in these cases. As discussed in Part I, nearly twenty percent of 
settlements in securities class actions are for less than two million dollars, a 
commonly used cutoff for nuisance settlements in this area.132 A similar outcome 
is possible in derivative and merger suits if corporations collectively refuse to 
enter into non-monetary settlements. Although these cases are cheaper to litigate 
than securities class actions, the litigation costs will likely still exceed a million 
dollars, and many corporations would therefore be willing to pay less than this 
amount to settle the claims. Even without nonmonetary settlement options, in 
other words, parties could likely still find ways to settle nuisance claims 
relatively cheaply. As a result, banning nonmonetary settlements is best viewed 
as part of a larger shareholder effort to reform shareholder litigation.  
 
130 See id. (“But ex post, once the corporation has become a defendant in merger litigation, 
that corporation has a strong incentive to buy the broad, cheap releases that disclosure 
settlements provide.”). 
131 LAARNI T. BULAN, ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
SETTLEMENTS: 2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2017), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-
reports/1996-2016/Settlements-Through-12-2016-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6AN-
KV2W] (showing that from 1996 to 2016, the minimum settlement in securites class action 
case was approximately $100,000). 
132 See BULAN, RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 54, at 5. 
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c. New Standing Requirements 
As a more radical option, shareholders could adopt enhanced standing 
requirements to reduce the agency costs in shareholder litigation. The legal 
system currently imposes minimal standing requirements on shareholders 
seeking to file representative lawsuits. In shareholder derivative suits, 
representative shareholders must own stock at the time of the alleged 
misconduct133 and hold this stock throughout the litigation.134 In securities class 
actions, the plaintiff must have purchased or sold the corporation’s securities 
during the class period.135 And in all shareholder lawsuits, the lead plaintiff must 
be an “adequate” representative,136 although this standard typically requires very 
little.137 
What the law does not require, however, is that the representative shareholder 
own a minimum amount of the corporation’s stock. At least in theory, a 
shareholder who owns just a single share of stock in the target corporation can 
challenge a merger or take a corporation to court for allegedly lying to its 
investors.138 This permissive approach to standing exacerbates the agency costs 
outlined above. The less of a stake that a shareholder has in the target company, 
the less time and expense the shareholder will be willing to invest in monitoring 
his or her attorney. 
Investors could change the standing rules in shareholder lawsuits. Rather than 
allowing any shareholder to embroil the company in litigation, no matter how 
small the shareholder’s holdings or how little the shareholder’s damages, a 
 
133 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2019). 
134 See Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 1984) (“A plaintiff who ceases to 
be a shareholder, whether by reason of a merger or for any other reason, loses standing to 
continue a derivative suit.”). 
135 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975) (holding that 
plaintiffs  lacked standing because they were neither “‘purchasers’ nor ‘sellers’”). 
136 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that “representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class”). 
137 See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1176 
(2009) (stating that the adequacy requirement “is fairly minimal––a modest and elementary 
principle of justice rather than an extraordinary and heroic burden”). 
138 This does not mean that the amount of stock a shareholder owns is irrelevant in the 
litigation. The PSLRA includes a rebuttable presumption that the shareholder applicant with 
the largest financial interest should be the lead plaintiff in the suit. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2012). State law also makes a shareholder’s holdings an important 
factor in choosing a lead plaintiff. See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., LLC, No. 19575, 
2002 WL 1558342, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002) (identifying as a factor in determining the 
lead plaintiff “the relative economic stakes of the competing litigants in the outcome of the 
lawsuit (to be accorded ‘great weight’)”). Under either approach, however, the amount of the 
plaintiff’s stock holdings is only a factor when it comes to choosing among those shareholders 
vying to be lead plaintiff. There is no amount of stock that a shareholder is required to own to 
file the lawsuit, and if there are no other shareholders seeking to serve as lead plaintiff, the 
sole applicant is typically appointed automatically. 
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company’s bylaws could provide for minimum ownership and/or damage 
requirements. A handful of companies have already made this change. For 
example, Emergent Capital, Inc. amended its bylaws to prohibit shareholders 
from filing a class action or derivative suit against the corporation, its directors, 
or its officers unless the shareholder owns at least three percent of the 
corporation’s stock.139 This bylaw was approved by both Emergent’s board and 
its shareholders.140 In adopting the bylaw, Emergent’s Chairman stated that “we 
strongly believe this is a very good bylaw that deters such suits without unduly 
impeding meritorious representative lawsuits.”141 
The three percent requirement is likely higher than most companies would 
want, although the optimal level of holdings or damages will vary depending on 
the size of the corporation and its concentration of ownership. In smaller 
corporations with relatively concentrated stock holdings, shareholders might 
choose to allow only those who own more than one or two percent of the 
corporation’s stock to file suit. In larger corporations with less concentrated 
stock ownership, it might make more sense to use a monetary threshold (i.e., one 
hundred thousand dollars) because there might not be many shareholders who 
own a significant percentage of the corporation’s stock. With either type of 
company, the objective should be to set the requirements high enough that only 
shareholders with the financial incentives to monitor the case can serve as 
representative plaintiffs, while still ensuring that there is an ample supply of 
potential plaintiffs among the corporation’s shareholders.142 
The adoption of minimum ownership requirements in shareholder litigation 
would be consistent with the approach used in other areas of corporate and 
securities law. Individual shareholders with only a single share of stock have 
little power to act on their own. To submit a shareholder proposal, for example, 
a shareholder must own at least two thousand dollars worth of stock in the 
corporation or one percent of the corporation’s outstanding stock.143 In addition, 
 
139 See Michael P. Matthews et al., Shareholder Suit Challenging Groundbreaking 
Minimum-Support-to-Sue Bylaw Dismissed, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.foley.com/shareholder-suit-challenging-groundbreaking-minimum-support-to-
sue-bylaw-dismissed-10-19-2015/. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. 
142 For this reason, standing requirements should not permit the aggregation of claims. If 
aggregation was permitted, a corporation with a minimum standing requirement of one 
hundred thousand dollars could be sued by a collection of one hundred shareholders each 
owning one hundred dollars worth of stock in the corporation. As scholars note in the 
securities class action context, such bundling undercuts the goal of having individual investors 
with the financial incentive to monitor their attorney. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, 
Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 54 (2001) (noting concerns regarding use of aggregation to unite 
large numbers of unrelated investors into a lead plaintiff group). 
143 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(b)(1) (2018). The Financial CHOICE Act would dramatically 
increase this ownership threshold, prohibiting shareholders from making shareholder 
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in many corporations, shareholders cannot call a special meeting unless they 
own a substantial stake in the company.144 These ownership requirements are 
not universal—small shareholders can, for example, request to inspect a 
corporation’s books and records145—but they are far from uncommon. 
Minimum ownership requirements are also consistent with the broader belief 
in corporate law that ownership stakes matter. Individual shareholders have very 
few rights in corporate law. Unless they own a majority of the company’s stock, 
they cannot elect or remove directors, amend bylaws, force a merger, or stop 
corporate transactions. Instead, these powers all rest with the shareholders as a 
whole. In short, shareholder litigation is one of the only areas in which a single 
shareholder owning a single share of stock can act on behalf of the corporation 
or other shareholders. Given the agency costs in shareholder litigation, 
shareholders would be justified in adopting new standing requirements that 
bring shareholder litigation more in line with the norms in other parts of 
corporate law.  
2. Tools to Control Cost Asymmetries 
Just as procedure offers tools to reduce agency costs, it also includes tools to 
control cost asymmetries. As described in Part I, the litigation costs in most 
shareholder lawsuits fall disproportionately on defendants. As a result, 
defendants often make the rational cost-benefit calculation that it is cheaper to 
settle and pay the plaintiffs’ fees than go through discovery and then try to get 
the case dismissed. Each of the procedural tools described in the prior Section 
could also help control cost asymmetries. Forum selection clauses, for example, 
can funnel shareholder litigation into forums in which judges keep a more 
watchful eye on discovery expenses, while enhanced standing requirements can 
ensure that the representative shareholder has enough of a financial stake in the 
corporation that it does not want to pressure the corporation into a nuisance 
settlement. This Section explores additional procedural tools that have the 
potential to address cost asymmetries, including heightened pleading 
requirements, discovery limitations, and fee and cost shifting.  
a. Heightened Pleading Requirements 
Institutional investors could adopt heightened pleading requirements to 
address the cost asymmetries in shareholder lawsuits. In general, shareholder 
lawsuits filed under state law are subject to traditional notice pleading rules. 
These pleading rules are quite minimal, requiring only that the plaintiff set forth 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
 
proposals unless they own at least one percent of the relevant company’s stock. See H.R. 10, 
115th Cong. § 844 (2017). 
144 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2019). 
145 See id. § 220 (allowing any stockholder to inspect various corporate records). 
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relief.”146 In contrast, shareholder lawsuits filed under federal law are subject to 
heightened pleading requirements. The PSLRA imposes heightened pleading 
requirements for two of the most crucial elements in a securities fraud claim—
whether the defendants made a false or misleading statement and whether they 
acted with the required state of mind.147 It also prohibits plaintiffs from obtaining 
any discovery until after they survive a motion to dismiss.148 
The heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA have faced a significant 
amount of criticism, and for good reason. These pleading requirements did help 
address the cost asymmetry between the parties. They also, however, 
exacerbated an information asymmetry between the parties. As discussed in Part 
I,149 defendants bear a disproportionate share of the discovery costs in these 
cases and thus have an economic incentive to settle even meritless cases.150 At 
the same time, however, plaintiffs in these cases often lack the information they 
need to evaluate the merits of their claims prior to discovery.151 This is especially 
true when it comes to the element of scienter, which requires plaintiffs to allege 
that the defendants knew what they were saying was false at the time they said 
it. 
The results were predictable. The PSLRA succeeded in reducing the number 
of nuisance suits—exactly the result that Congress wanted. Yet it also eliminated 
non-frivolous claims, as several empirical studies demonstrated.152 In short, the 
heightened pleading requirements in the PSLRA made it harder for shareholders 
to file both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims alike. 
 
146 FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
147 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1), (2) (2012). 
148 See id. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B). 
149 See supra Section I.B.2. 
150 See Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 38 n.2 (Del. 1996) (“It is a fact 
evident to all of those who are familiar with shareholder litigation that surviving a motion to 
dismiss means, as a practical matter, that economical rational defendants (who are usually not 
apt to be repeat players in these kinds of cases) will settle such claims, often for a peppercorn 
and a fee.”). 
151 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN L. REV. 497, 549 (1991) (“Since discovery in securities 
class actions is almost completely one-sided, plaintiffs [or their attorneys] control the 
discovery agenda.”). 
152 See Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 64-67 (2009) 
(“There is evidence . . . that pre-PSLRA nonnuisance claims would be less likely to be filed 
under the PSLRA regime.”); Eric Talley & Gudrun Johnsen, Corporate Governance, 
Executive Compensation and Securities Litigation (U.S.C. Gould Sch. of Law, Olin Research 
Paper No. 04-7, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=536963 
(presenting data “that even if the PSLRA reduced frivolous litigation (as its proponents 
claim), it likely deterred meritorious litigation as well, and in such proportions as to swamp 
the deterring effects on non–meritorious suits”). 
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What would better heightened pleading requirements look like? First, they 
would focus on specific elements of the claims in question. The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 in Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly153 has been criticized for raising pleading standards across the board, 
without regard to the difficulties of pleading facts that plaintiffs cannot obtain 
prior to discovery.154 While any interpretation of Rule 8 inevitably applies to a 
wide swath of claims with different elements and different fact-finding 
challenges, heightened pleading requirements in corporate bylaws can be more 
targeted.155  
In derivative and merger litigation, heightened pleading requirements should 
focus on facts supporting the claim that the directors and officers breached their 
fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duty claims resemble tort claims,156 which involve four 
elements: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.157 Any heightened 
pleading requirements in this area should focus only on the second element—
breach of duty. Plaintiffs should have to allege facts with particularity showing 
that the directors and officers breached their fiduciary duty. With respect to all 
other elements of these claims, normal pleading rules should apply. These 
targeted pleading requirements would require plaintiffs to put their cards on the 
table early for the elements most central to the case, while allowing them to wait 
longer for elements such as causation and damages that may be harder to support 
with specific facts prior to the discovery process. 
Second, new pleading requirements could include an exception for 
information that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain. Such exceptions are 
common in statutes imposing heightened pleading requirements, although the 
PSLRA itself does not include one. For example, in proposed legislation related 
to patent litigation, plaintiffs would have been required to plead certain specified 
facts about their patent claim “unless the information is not reasonably 
accessible.”158 The Act further stated that “if information required to be 
 
153 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
154 See, e.g., Alexander Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1, 29 (2012) (“Where the informational asymmetry favors the responding 
party . . . there is little justification for applying an information-forcing principle to the 
pleader.”); Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Question, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 114 (2009) 
(“If the operative pleading standard required plaintiff to allege facts that she cannot reasonably 
be expected to know at the case’s inception, this informational asymmetry would in turn 
prevent proper functioning of the litigation market.”). 
155 See Erickson, supra note 8, at 89. 
156 See J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and the 
Delaware Uniform Contribution Act, 11 DEL. L. REV. 71, 71 (2010) (“We conclude that a 
breach of a fiduciary duty is in fact a tort, although a unique species historically called an 
‘equitable tort.’”). But see MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271, 
at *12 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (“Fiduciary duties exist independent of tort obligations.”). 
157 Preston v. Preston, No. 6049, 1981 WL 15086, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 1981). 
158 Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). 
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disclosed under [the Act’s heightened pleading requirements] is not readily 
accessible to a party after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, as 
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, that information may instead be 
generally described.”159 Under these circumstances, however, the plaintiff must 
also include “an explanation of why such undisclosed information was not 
readily accessible, and of any efforts made by such party to access such 
information.”160 Such detailed requirements make it difficult for plaintiffs to 
generically claim that the required facts are not reasonably accessible.  
Finally, institutional investors can take steps to ensure that plaintiffs continue 
to have access to pre-suit discovery. Heightened pleading requirements are often 
criticized because plaintiffs have few ways to uncover the facts needed to 
support their claims prior to discovery. Shareholder lawsuits, however, are 
different. Many states, including Delaware, have laws that allow shareholders to 
obtain copies of a company’s books and records as long as they have a proper 
purpose for requesting this information.161 Courts have held that investigating 
wrongdoing by the corporation’s managers is a “proper purpose” within the 
scope of these statutes.162 These provisions are crucial to enabling plaintiffs to 
obtain the facts necessary to comply with any new heightened pleading 
requirements. Institutional investors should therefore ensure that companies are 
complying with their requirements under these state law provisions.163  
Thus far, the discussion has focused on new heightened pleading 
requirements for state law claims. Institutional investors, however, could also 
use this opportunity to revisit the heightened pleading requirements imposed by 
the PSLRA on federal securities claims. Institutional investors could include an 
exception to these requirements if the underlying facts needed to support certain 
elements are not reasonably accessible, similar to the proposed exception 
described above in fiduciary duty claims. Alternatively, investors could 
eliminate the heightened pleading requirements that govern scienter entirely. 
The PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirement regarding scienter has been 
criticized extensively because it requires plaintiffs to allege facts regarding the 




161 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2019); Melzer v. CNet Networks, Inc., 934 
A.2d 912, 917 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Before shareholders may inspect books and records, they 
must demonstrate . . . a proper purpose for seeking inspection.”). 
162 Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 (Del. 2006) (“It is well 
established that a stockholder’s desire to investigate wrongdoing or mismanagement is a 
‘proper purpose.’”). 
163 In states that do not give shareholders the right to inspect a corporation’s books and 
records, shareholders could include such a right in the corporation’s bylaws. 
164 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 58, at 600 (“Without discovery until after the motion to 
dismiss . . . plaintiffs face a difficult time in gathering facts related to the state of mind of 
particular defendants in engaging in fraud.”). 
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requirements are difficult enough to satisfy without requiring plaintiffs to allege 
what was going on in the defendants’ heads at a specific moment in time. At the 
time of the PSLRA, such heightened pleading requirements may have made 
more sense because the default standards under Rule 9 were so lax.165 Post-
Twombly, however, plaintiffs now have to plead specific facts supporting all of 
their claims,166 so the current default standards may suffice to solve any concerns 
about lax pleading in this area.  
As discussed further in Part III, it is not entirely clear whether such company-
specific overrides would be permissible. It is an open question whether 
companies can modify—or even bypass altogether—the procedural 
requirements imposed by statute. Are the PSLRA or state corporate governance 
statutes merely a set of default rules that apply if and until companies choose to 
change them? Or are they a mandatory set of requirements that apply even if 
companies and their shareholders would prefer a different set of procedural 
rules? As explored in Part III, the limits of private ordering in this area have 
never been clearly delineated, but current law provides grounds for optimism 
that shareholders can experiment in this area.167 
b. Cost and Fee Shifting 
Shareholders should also consider provisions that allow fee and cost shifting 
in shareholder litigation. Such provisions would reverse the presumption that 
each side pays its own attorney’s fees and discovery costs. Under the right 
circumstances, such reforms could help address the cost asymmetries in 
shareholder lawsuits. The problem in cost asymmetric cases is that the plaintiff 
has far less on the line than the defendant. They typically have less discovery 
material because most shareholder plaintiffs have few relevant documents and 
know relatively little about the case. Accordingly, their discovery costs (and the 
accompanying attorneys’ fees to locate and produce this discovery) are typically 
far lower than the defendants’ costs. As a result, the plaintiff has little to lose by 
filing a meritless lawsuit. 
Fee and cost shifting rules change this calculus, albeit in slightly different 
ways. With fee shifting, plaintiffs who know that they will have to pay their 
opponents’ legal fees if they lose will be far more reluctant to file a meritless 
case. Additionally, defendants who know that they will be able to recover their 
legal fees if they prevail will no longer see these fees as sunk costs. Along similar 
lines, with cost shifting, plaintiffs would no longer be able to serve sweeping 
requests on defendants and use the costs of responding as a lever in settlement 
discussions. Instead, both sides would have an incentive to tailor their discovery 
 
165 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 includes heightened pleading requirements for fraud 
claims generally, but “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind 
may be alleged generally.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
166 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-57 (2007). 
167 See infra Section III.C (addressing legal hurdles that institutional investors may face in 
implementing customized procedural rules). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160 
  
2019] INVESTING IN CORPORATE PROCEDURE 1401 
 
requests to the specific needs of the litigation. Unlike fee-shifting rules, which 
only require losing parties to contribute to their opponents’ attorneys’ fees, cost-
shifting rules require each side to share the costs of litigation, regardless of 
which side ultimately prevails. 
Although fee and cost shifting would both address the cost asymmetries in 
litigation, fee-shifting rules stand on shakier legal ground than any of the other 
procedural reforms suggested in this Part. In 2015, after intense lobbying by the 
plaintiffs’ bar, the Delaware General Assembly banned fee shifting, stating that 
“the bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose liability on a 
stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other 
party in connection with an internal corporate claim.”168 Delaware was right to 
be concerned about corporations adopting fee-shifting provisions. Shareholder 
plaintiffs have little to gain by serving in this role—receiving a pro rata share of 
any recovery, plus a small incentive payment if approved by the court. If the 
class action is not successful, however, the class representative would be liable 
for the entire fee award, which could amount to millions of dollars. Faced with 
this imbalance, few class representatives would agree to lend their name to a 
lawsuit.  
Yet such concerns do not mean that these provisions always place shareholder 
litigation in peril. There are ways to implement fee-shifting rules that would not 
discourage class representatives from participating in suits, while also 
complying with Delaware’s new limitations. Instead of making class 
representatives liable for the defendants’ costs, for example, shareholders could 
require class counsel to pay the defendant’s legal fees if the lawsuit is 
unsuccessful. This rule would not violate Delaware’s statutory prohibition 
against fee shifting, which only bars provisions that impose liability “on a 
stockholder.”169 Attorneys are not stockholders, at least in the typical suit, so 
they are not covered by the statute.170  
Standing alone, applying fee-shifting rules to attorneys would not address 
Delaware’s concerns, even if it would be outside the scope of the state’s 
 
168 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019). 
169 Id. 
170 Opponents could argue that the legal system is not perfect and thus firms could be 
penalized if they file a meritorious suit that is nonetheless unsuccessful. The market, however, 
could provide a solution to this concern. In England, for example, a robust after-the-event 
(“ATE”) insurance market allows a party who is nervous about the consequences of losing at 
trial to purchase insurance to cover his opponent’s legal fees in event of a loss. See, e.g., 
Jonathan T. Molot, Fee Shifting and The Free Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1820-21 
(2013) (“Claimants able to purchase ATE insurance can proceed with meritorious claims 
without fear of bearing their opponents’ costs.”). A similar market could theoretically protect 
law firms that would otherwise personally bear the cost of unsuccessful claims. The actuarial 
nature of insurance markets could incentivize law firms to screen their cases carefully, while 
also providing a safety net if the legal system disagrees with a firm on the merits of a particular 
claim. 
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legislation as presently worded. Instead, it would simply discourage a different 
group from participating in these cases, if these attorneys stand to lose more than 
they might gain. Accordingly, shareholders should couple any fee-shifting rules 
with a related provision awarding prevailing class counsel higher fees than they 
currently receive. This approach would increase both the risk and reward of 
shareholder lawsuits, creating even greater incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
choose wisely when deciding which cases to file.171 
Even with these modifications, however, shareholders should exercise 
caution when adopting fee- and cost-shifting rules. These rules radically change 
the economic structure of representative litigation, and it is easy to imagine the 
rules having unanticipated consequences, especially since the U.S. legal system 
has little experience with these procedural tools. For example, shareholders 
would not want to implement rules that create costly satellite litigation over the 
exact amount of discovery costs or attorneys’ fees to be billed to the other side. 
Nor would they want to give defendants an incentive to drive up their discovery 
costs to give them leverage in settlement negotiations. There are ways to 
ameliorate these concerns—courts can manage the discovery process more 
closely or the parties can agree on their discovery plans up front172—but these 
solutions are unlikely to completely eliminate concerns about satellite litigation 
and perverse incentives.  
In addition, fee and cost shifting could inhibit shareholders’ access to justice. 
Larger plaintiffs’ firms could likely absorb the costs of discovery, as well as 
their opponents’ attorneys’ fees, if they lose. Smaller firms, however, may be in 
a more financially precarious position, unable to absorb a multi-million dollar 
award of fees or costs to the defendants. For these firms, even if they think their 
claims are meritorious, the mere possibility of bankrupting their firm may steer 
them away from claims shareholders would like them to bring. One way to 
reduce this risk is to cap the fees. For example, these provisions could make 
firms liable for the first one million dollrs of the company’s legal fees, or the 
 
171 One concern with this approach is that it could create a conflict of interest between 
class counsel and members of the class. There could be situations in which class counsel 
would be better off with a lower settlement rather than risk having to pay their opponents’ 
legal fees if the case continues, even if the class itself, facing no such risk of loss, would rather 
roll the dice on a judgment at trial. These conflicts already exist to some extent in any class 
action, given that class counsel often advances the costs of the lawsuit and, through the 
contingency fee, may stand to gain more than any individual class member. Nonetheless, if 
shareholder plaintiffs have sizable stakes in the case (as anticipated by the minimum 
ownership and damage rules described above), plaintiffs should be able to mediate these 
concerns with their counsel. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing methods 
such as minimum ownership to prevent abusive shareholder litigation practices). 
172 See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 859 (2015) 
(proposing model by which parties develop litigation budget at start of case and present it for 
court approval, following similar proposal adopted in United Kingdom). 
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first five hundred thousand of the company’s discovery costs.173 Alternatively, 
this cap could depend on the size of the target company or the amount of claimed 
damages, expressly allowing smaller law firms to incur less risk by suing smaller 
firms or bringing claims with lower potential damages.  
Even with these accommodations in mind, the concerns suggest that 
shareholders might want to try the other procedural tools suggested in this Part 
before adopting fee or cost shifting provisions. The field of civil procedure offers 
a variety of tools for addressing agency costs and cost asymmetries, but each 
comes with its own risks and challenges. With heightened pleading, plaintiffs 
risk dismissal of their claims.174 With fee or cost shifting, however, plaintiffs (or 
their attorneys) risk financial ruin. As a result, fee and cost shifting could 
discourage borderline claims that shareholders and their attorneys think could 
have merit, even if they are not legal slam dunks. Companies may want to 
stagger adoption of these procedures to see if more modest measures, such as 
heightened pleading or minimum ownership requirements, will solve the 
problems in these cases before adopting more sweeping procedures, such as fee 
or cost shifting.  
c. Arbitration 
No review of procedural alternatives would be complete without a discussion 
of arbitration. The procedures outlined above would all apply within the 
traditional legal system. Yet parties can opt out of this system altogether by 
sending their dispute to arbitration. Each arbitration body has its own set of 
procedural rules,175 which are often considerably different than the procedural 
rules that apply in a court. 
Although shareholders may have the legal right to arbitrate their claims,176 
that does not mean that it is in their best interest to do so. Arbitration is often 
thought to be cheaper and faster than traditional litigation, in large part because 
discovery is much more limited.177 Yet limited discovery in arbitration is not a 
 
173 The insurance markets described above, see supra note 170, could similarly help defray 
these potential risks. 
174 For further discussion of heightened pleading, see supra Section II.B.2.a. 
175 See infra note 177 (outlining procedural rules for arbitration). 
176 But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019) (prohibiting forum selection clauses that 
send shareholder litigation to any jurisdiction other than Delaware courts). It is an open 
question whether this law passes muster under the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 
(2012) (prohibiting states from banning arbitration clauses in written contracts). 
177 See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, INCLUDING 
PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 19 (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 
2013) (outling rules for pre-hearing exchange and production); INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 25 (INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2014) (“The tribunal 
may, upon application, require a party to make available to another party documents in that 
party’s possession not otherwise available to the party seeking the documents, that are 
reasonably believed to exist and to be relevant and material to the outcome of the case.”). 
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sure thing. Indeed, the New York State Bar recently noted that “there has been 
a trend to inject into arbitration expensive elements that had traditionally been 
reserved for litigation—interrogatories; requests to admit; dispositive motions; 
lengthy depositions; and massive requests for documents, including electronic 
data.”178 Parties now bemoan the fact that discovery in arbitration has “spiraled 
out of control” as arbitrators make ad hoc decisions about how much discovery 
should occur in individual cases.179 It is still true that parties generally get less 
discovery in arbitration, but it is hardly a sure bet.180 As a result, agreements to 
arbitrate shareholder claims do not put to bed concerns about discovery costs. 
Moreover, if shareholders want more limited discovery rights, they do not 
need to go to arbitration to get them. Instead, they can stay in the traditional legal 
system, but limit the discovery rights that apply in this system. Discovery rules 
are largely default rules, and parties are free to amend them.181 For example, 
corporate bylaws could narrow the scope of discovery or provide that parties are 
only entitled to a certain number of depositions.182 They can also provide that 
the parties are only entitled to discovery specifically approved by a judge.183 
Alternatively, if shareholders are nervous about tying their own hands before 
they know the details of the dispute, they can instead provide for cost shifting, 
as suggested above, which forces each side to decide whether the benefits of the 
requested discovery is worth the costs.184 In short, discovery costs alone do not 
justify a retreat to arbitration. 
The other purported benefit of arbitration is that it checks the dangers of 
aggregate litigation. The opt-out nature of most class actions means that class 
 
178 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT BY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 




179 Id. (“In some cases, it has spiraled out of control and has reached a point where some 
users of arbitration feel that there is little difference between arbitration and litigation.”). 
180 Nor is arbitration necessarily faster than litigation. See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build 
It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 585 (2007) (noting that the average time to resolve a case 
through arbitration is only slightly shorter that the median time to resolve a case through the 
litigation system). 
181 See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 (“Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate 
that . . . procedures governing or limiting discovery be modified.”). 
182 See Jessica Erickson, Bespoke Procedure, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1873, 1876 (2018) (“To 
address concerns that discovery is too expensive, parties can agree ex ante to limit the scope 
of discovery, place caps on the number of depositions or document requests, or enter into 
binding discovery budgets.”). 
183 See id. at 1891 (“Parties can also agree that they are only entitled to discovery if their 
discovery request is specifically approved by a judge or arbitrator.”). 
184 See supra Section II.B.2.b (detailing concept of cost shifting). 
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members are joined in the suit unless they affirmatively opt out.185 As a result, 
defendants may feel pressured to settle because the potential damages can be so 
high that the suit threatens the company’s financial viability.186 Many arbitration 
clauses, however, include class action waivers, allowing injured parties to sue 
only on their own behalf.187 These waivers allow defendants to avoid aggregate 
claims and the dangers that go along with them.188 In theory, such a limitation 
might be appealing to those reflecting on the troubled history of shareholder 
class actions. 
Yet prohibiting shareholders from joining together to bring their claims would 
ultimately hurt many shareholders. Some shareholders, especially large 
shareholders with positive value claims, would be fine in a regime that does not 
permit class actions.189 Smaller shareholders, however, would find it cost 
prohibitive to bring their claims on an individual basis. As a result, they would 
be effectively barred from seeking compensation for their claims.190 Just as 
importantly, shrinking the number of potential claimants reduces the overall 
deterrent effects of shareholder litigation, hurting large and small shareholders 
 
185 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (stating that class members can be automatically included in 
suit unless they opt out of class); Scott Dodson, An Opt-in Option for Class Actions, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 171, 173 (2016) (“The empirical evidence strongly suggests that opt-out classes 
are much larger than opt-in classes and that individual litigation by excluded class members 
is rare.”). 
186 Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: 
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1890 (2004) (“[C]ertification increases 
plaintiffs’ opportunities for profit . . . .”). 
187 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s 
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer 
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882-84 (2008) (finding that eighty percent of 
contracts imposed by financial services and telecommunications firms contained class action 
waivers). 
188 See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of 
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 425-27 (2005) (discussing why class action 
waivers will become more commonly used). 
189 See David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
201, 233 (2015) (arguing that trustees overseeing institutional investment vehicles have 
fiduciary duty to bring positive-value claims). 
190 And ironically, even if small shareholders could not sue themselves, they would still 
have to pay (at least indirectly) the costs of securities class actions because they have a 
financial stake in the target corporation. In other words, channeling shareholder claims into 
arbitration would take money from the pockets of smaller shareholders and put it in the 
pockets of larger shareholders. See id. at 259 (“Conversely, many smaller institutional 
investors and most, if not all, individual investors will have negative-value claims. 
Consequently, they will have no remedy for their wrong. Yet they may very well remain 
invested in the defendant company after the fraud.”). 
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alike.191 If corporate managers think that their potential liability has plummeted, 
they may be more likely to enrich themselves at shareholders’ expense.192  
This discussion reveals a powerful lesson about the role of procedural 
rulemaking. In the past, when new procedural rules were incorporated into 
corporate bylaws, they were almost always pro-defense—i.e., reforms that make 
it more difficult for shareholders to bring representative claims.193 Yet, while 
corporate boards prefer such procedures, their shareholders may well have more 
nuanced views about the right procedures for these cases because it is not always 
in their interest to make it more difficult to bring shareholder lawsuits. 
Sometimes the right procedural tools will curtail shareholders suits, while other 
times they will make it easier to file these claims.194 In short, as we will see, it 
takes the right incentives to push for the right procedures. 
III. PROMOTING A NEW MARKET FOR CORPORATE PROCEDURE 
The analysis thus far demonstrates that procedural reform can play a pivotal 
role in addressing the problems that have long plagued shareholder litigation. In 
a perfect world, the story would end there. Once we know what new procedures 
to adopt, we could simply adopt them, and the problems would be solved. In the 
complicated world of shareholder litigation, however, identifying the right 
reforms is only the first piece of the puzzle. The right actors must also push for 
their adoption. Corporate law has long relied on three groups to address the 
 
191 Scholars have long argued that deterrence is the central goal of shareholder litigation. 
See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors and Officers 
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 762 (2009) (“Scholars 
customarily treat deterrence as the principal objective of civil damages in corporate and 
securities litigation.”); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b–5, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1314 (2008) (“[M]ost commentators now agree that the prototypical 
Rule 10b–5 class action (i.e., one brought against a nontrading corporation for its officer’s 
fraud-on-the-market) cannot be defended on compensatory grounds.”). 
192 It is possible that the dynamics would play out differently if, for example, the large 
shareholders who brought individual claims insisted that officer and director defendants 
personally paid part of the settlement proceeds, rather than relying entirely on their insurance 
carrier. See, e.g., Webber, supra note 189, at 264 (“It is also possible that institutional 
investors will demand, as a condition for settling an arbitration, that individually culpable 
defendants make personal payments towards the settlement.”). 
193 For a discussion of fee-shifting bylaws, see supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
194 While this Part proposes some procedural reforms that shareholders could adopt, it is 
by no means an exhaustive list. Shareholders might experiment with limitations on discovery 
or new summary judgment standards, or they might tinker with damage rules. Further still, 
they might decide to repeal some of the procedural relics that have long been associated with 
certain types of shareholder litigation, such as the demand requirement or contemporaneous 
ownership requirement in derivative suits. The point is not that there is a single procedural 
talisman that will solve all of the problems in shareholder litigation, but rather that companies 
should experiment to find the right procedural tools for their particular situation. 
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problems in shareholder litigation: judges, legislatures, and corporate boards. 
Yet, as explained below, none of these groups have the right incentives to 
promote the necessary procedural changes. 
This Part suggests a new actor to drive these reforms: institutional investors. 
Institutional investors have the right financial incentives to push for these new 
reforms because they stand on both sides of these lawsuits. As a result, they are 
financially invested in both preserving meritorious lawsuits and blocking 
meritless ones. No other group has these dual incentives. The discussion below 
first explains why other groups have run into roadblocks in trying to solve the 
problems in shareholder litigation. It then explains why institutional investors 
are uniquely situated to push for the procedural reforms laid out in Part II.  
A. Institutional Roadblocks 
Corporate law has traditionally looked to judges, legislatures, and corporate 
boards to solve the problems in shareholder litigation. This Section explains why 
none of these groups have the right incentives and/or power to advocate for 
sweeping procedural reform. 
1. Judicial Reform 
Judges already use procedure as a key weapon in their effort to monitor 
shareholder litigation.195 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class 
actions and derivative suits cannot settle without the approval of the presiding 
judge.196 In carrying out this responsibility, judges are supposed to ensure that 
proposed settlements are “fair, reasonable, and adequate” in protecting the 
interests of represented parties.197 In theory, therefore, judges already have a 
procedural tool to address the problems in shareholder litigation. 
In practice, however, this tool falls short. Judges cannot easily probe under 
the surface of most settlements. Unlike motions practice where the parties are 
on opposite sides and are quick to point out the weaknesses of each other’s 
arguments, settlements are a joint proposal by the parties. The non-adversarial 
nature of settlement hearings means that it is difficult for judges to discern the 
problems in proposed settlements. The Delaware Court of Chancery has stated, 
for example, that it is forced to become a “forensic examiner . . . play[ing] 
devil’s advocate” to determine the value of settlement terms.198 
 
195 See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 390 (2011) 
(“Their job is to adjust for and counteract the agency problems and litigation gaps. It is 
through this process that the judges become settlement gatekeepers.”). 
196 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), 23.1(c) (outlining procedure for class action settlement and 
derivative actions). 
197 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
198 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
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Few judges are willing to play this role. Most judges have busy dockets, and 
they do not want to go looking for a fight where none exists.199 Moreover, even 
if judges decide to inquire more deeply, they may find it difficult to hold onto 
their cases. Delaware’s experience trying to crack down on merger litigation 
illustrates this point. As discussed in Section II.A, plaintiffs’ attorneys took their 
cases elsewhere when Delaware judges tried to rein in disclosure-only 
settlements.200 In other words, there is a clear downside in relying on judges to 
police nuisance settlements—many judges do not want to play this role, and 
those who do lack the tools to hold onto their cases. 
Nor can judges simply adopt new procedural tools to augment their existing 
ones. Judges enforce the procedural rules on the books; they do not write the 
rules themselves. They do have some flexibility to fill in procedural gaps in the 
existing rules through local rules or standing orders, but they cannot adopt 
altogether new requirements. As a result, even if judges wanted to adopt the new 
procedures outlined in Part II, they lack the power to do so. 
2. Legislatures 
The legislative branch has an easier time making wholesale changes to the 
law. While individual judges are limited to the cases pending before them, 
Congress can enact laws that apply to all cases of a given type. In enacting the 
PSLRA for example, Congress made sweeping changes to the law governing 
securities class actions, regardless of where these cases were filed.201 State 
legislatures are more limited in their reach, but they can still alter the rules in 
cases governed by their states’ law. It is no surprise, therefore, that both federal 
and state legislators have occasionally tried to fix the problems in shareholder 
litigation.202 
Their efforts, however, reveal the downsides of relying on the legislative 
branch to develop nuanced solutions to complex litigation challenges. 
Legislators are subject to lobbying by those whose interests may be impacted by 
new legislation. With the PSLRA, for example, Congress heard extensive 
testimony from corporate America regarding the problems with securities class 
 
199 See, e.g., Sale, supra note 195, at 411 (“Of course, if judicial gatekeepers spend more 
time on settlements, they may increase the amount of time that cases spend on the docket. 
Busy judges will then face their own personal and professional conflicts with resisting and 
scrutinizing settlements.”). 
200 For further discussion, see supra Section II.A. 
201 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (outlining investigations and actions). 
202 See, e.g., id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (prohibiting bylaws of Delaware 
corporations from containing “any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for 
the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an 
internal corporate claim”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (2017) (adopting loser pays rules in 
derivative suits filed against Oklahoma corporations). 
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actions.203 It heard much less from the investors who benefit from these suits. 
This partisan jockeying left little opportunity for careful consideration of 
appropriate solutions. As a result, as discussed above,204 the PSLRA includes 
many procedural reforms inappropriate for the information asymmetries that 
plaintiffs in these suits face.205 
State legislatures are not immune from these challenges. In Delaware, for 
example, the General Assembly relies on the corporate bar to suggest and draft 
changes related to corporate law.206 These lawyers, while certainly 
knowledgeable, have a vested interest in ensuring that shareholder litigation 
remains a viable source of income for Delaware lawyers.207 As a result, they are 
unlikely to take any broad action that might threaten their monopoly.208 In other 
states, legislative action is difficult for different reasons. Few states outside of 
Delaware see enough shareholder litigation to make legislative action 
worthwhile, and even those state legislatures that choose to address it are 
unlikely to have enough expertise in the area to develop nuanced legislative 
solutions.209 
3. Corporate Boards 
Perhaps recognizing the limitations of judges and legislatures, corporate law 
recently vested boards of directors with greater power to police shareholder 
 
203 See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. 
& Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong. 217 (1994) (testimony of 
Stephen F. Smith, Gen. Counsel, Exabyte Corp.) (alleging plaintiffs’ attorneys often utilized 
computer-generated boilerplate complaints). 
204 See supra notes 147-152 and accompanying text. 
205 See Erickson, supra note 8, at 71-72, 113-16. 
206 See Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 48 (2014) 
(“Council of Corporation Law, a group of 27 well-respected attorneys mostly from prominent 
Wilmington firms, proposes all amendments to the DGCL. The Council writes the corporate 
law of Delaware and, by extension, the country.”). 
207 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory 
of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987) (“[R]ules that Delaware 
supplies often can be viewed as attempts to maximize revenues to the bar, and more 
particularly to an elite cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state.”). 
208 See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 875 (“[I]f [Delaware] wishes to ensure that future 
legislation advances both sound public policy and the State’s financial interests, the General 
Assembly needs to free itself from the bar’s influence.”). 
209 For example, Oklahoma recently adopted a fee-shifting statute pursuant to which losing 
parties in derivative suits are now required to pay their opponents’ expenses, including 
attorneys’ fees. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (2017). Commentators have reported that this 
statute was the result of lobbying by a prominent Oklahoma company, Continental Resources, 
which had faced a fiduciary duty lawsuit. See Gary W. Derrick, Recent Developments in 
Oklahoma Business and Corporate Law 2014, at 11 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://derrickandbriggs.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Seminar-paper-recent-
developments-2014.docx [https://perma.cc/K944-Y9UE]. The statute itself reflects these pro-
defense roots, making it financially perilous for any shareholder to file a derivative suit. 
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litigation. As discussed above, in 2010, the Delaware Court of Chancery invited 
corporations concerned about litigating in multiple jurisdictions to include a 
forum selection provision in their corporate charter.210 Following this invitation, 
several hundred companies adopted forum selection provisions.211 This 
development paved the way for corporations to consider other types of private 
ordering, including fee-shifting bylaws,212 minimum ownership requirements,213 
and arbitration provisions.214 Scholars have largely cheered on this development, 
while exploring other ways that corporations can engage in litigation self-
help.215 
The problem is that there is significant reason to question whether corporate 
directors are the right people to rewrite these rules, at least on their own.216 
Directors are typically among the defendants in these cases.217 As a result, they 
draft procedures that will govern suits that may later be filed against them and, 
in doing so, they will inevitably be influenced by concerns about their own self-
interest. For obvious reasons, the legal system does not usually put parties in 
charge of drafting the procedural rules that will later determine their legal fate. 
 
210 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of 
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value 
promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter 
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”). 
211 See Romano & Sanga, supra note 104, at 3 (finding that, as of August 2014, 754 public 
companies had adopted these provisions). 
212 The Delaware General Assembly has since prohibited these provisions. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (“The bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose 
liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other 
party in connection with an internal corporate claim . . . .”). 
213 Soon after the Delaware Supreme Court upheld fee-shifting bylaws, four related 
companies announced bylaws prohibiting its stockholders from initiating a direct or derivative 
claim unless the claiming stockholder delivers to the corporate secretary written consent by 
beneficial stockholders owning at least three percent of the outstanding shares. See, e.g., 
Imperial Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2014) (“[C]urrent or prior 
shareholder or group of shareholders . . . may not initiate a claim in a court of law on behalf 
of . . . any class of current and/or prior shareholders against the corporation . . . unless the 
Claiming Shareholder . . . delivers to the Secretary written consents by beneficial 
shareholders owning at least 3% of the outstanding shares of the corporation . . . .”). 
214 See Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in 
Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 587 (2016) (arguing that Federal 
Arbitration Act does not require states to uphold corporate bylaw or charter provisions 
mandating that shareholder claims be arbitrated). 
215 See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 16, at 3 (promoting “No Pay” provisions). 
216 See infra Section III.B (discussing merit to having corporate boards play role in 
development of procedural bylaws, but also risk of having boards do so without significant 
input or oversight from other corporate constituencies). 
217 See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 852 n.1 (using term shareholder litigation to encompass 
suits by “shareholders under state corporate law against any combination of the corporate 
entity and its officers and directors”). 
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The perils of this approach are far from theoretical. As discussed in Part II, 
after the Delaware Court of Chancery invited boards to take procedure into their 
own hands, many boards amended their bylaws to include fee-shifting 
provisions.218 Representative shareholders only receive their pro rata share of 
the recovery if the suit is successful, but these provisions made them liable for 
100% of the costs if it is not successful.219 This combination of high risks and 
low rewards makes it financially perilous for any shareholder to serve as a lead 
plaintiff, threatening the entire shareholder litigation franchise. As a result, if the 
goal of these boards was to eliminate all shareholder litigation, these bylaw 
provisions were a good start.  
So far, courts have been relatively unconcerned about these potential conflicts 
of interests. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund220 the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that litigation-limiting charter and bylaw provisions are 
facially valid.221 The court retained the right to review these provisions on an as-
applied basis to determine whether they are “adopted by the appropriate 
corporate procedures and for a proper corporate purpose.”222 This standard, for 
example, might prohibit a board from adopting protective procedures after its 
members have been sued. It does not, however, account for the more pervasive 
structural biases that exist when boards adopt procedures that may later govern 
litigation filed against them.223 
Courts are not the only bodies that can try to guard against these structural 
biases. Directors ultimately answer to shareholders in elections that take place 
every one to three years.224 If directors put procedures in place that insulate them 
from shareholder litigation, and shareholders oppose the move, in theory they 
can vote the directors out of office at the next election. Shareholders can also 
sell their stock, choosing to invest in companies that offer shareholders greater 
opportunities to constrain managerial agency costs. If enough shareholders sell 
their shares, the stock price will fall, financially penalizing the corporation. Or 
 
218 See id. at 858 (noting that “over fifty Delaware corporations adopted fee-shifting 
bylaws by April 2015”). 
219 See, e.g., Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 14, at 515-16 (“[I]t will be difficult 
for even the largest institutional investors to take the risk of paying millions, or tens of 
millions, of dollars in defense attorneys’ fees to correct corporate misconduct when their 
individual, pro rata share of the potential benefit or recovery created by the litigation will only 
be a fraction of the total benefit sought . . . .”). 
220 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
221 Id. at 560 (“Under Delaware law, a fee-shifting by-law is not invalid per se . . . .”). 
222 Id. at 554. 
223 Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Paving the Delaware Way: Legislative 
and Equitable Limits on Bylaws After ATP, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 335, 357-60 (2015) 
(proposing that courts use enhanced scrutiny in reviewing litigation-limiting bylaw 
provisions). 
224 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2019) (“[A]t each annual election held after such 
classification becomes effective, directors shall be chosen for a full term . . . .”). 
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shareholders can simply overrule directors, amending the bylaws on their own 
to delete or amend the procedures put in place by the board. In theory, therefore, 
shareholders can constrain procedural rulemaking by directors. 
In practice, however, shareholders are limited in their ability to control 
directors. Shareholder voting has long been criticized for its inability to serve as 
an effective check on director power.225 At many corporations’ annual elections, 
there is only a single slate of directors. Shareholders unhappy with their 
performance can withhold their vote, but the slate will likely still be elected. 
Shareholders can put up their own slate, but this process is extremely expensive 
and time-consuming.226 Similar hurdles apply when shareholders try to amend 
corporate bylaws on their own.227  
This analysis is not meant to cast aspersions on corporate boards. Corporate 
law vests significant power in corporate boards,228 and for good reason.229 At the 
same time, however, the law has long recognized that boards have conflicts of 
interests that sometimes require greater judicial scrutiny and that the market is 
constrained in its ability to monitor.230 These conflicts are fully present when 
boards insert litigation-limiting provisions into corporations’ governing 
documents. Accordingly, corporate boards should not be the primary drivers of 
procedural reform.  
B. The Unique Potential of Institutional Investors 
Corporate law was on the right track when it invited corporations to include 
procedural innovations in their governing documents. Procedure is designed to 
sort the good cases from the bad, and, if done right, it can reduce the incentives 
to enter into nuisance settlements. To date, however, corporate boards have been 
the primary drafters of new procedural rules to govern shareholder lawsuits, 
creating a structural bias when they draft procedures that may later be used 
against them. Institutional investors, on the other hand, have far better economic 
 
225 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 
675, 676 (2007) (“[S]hareholder franchise does not provide the solid foundation for the 
legitimacy of directorial power that it is supposed to supply.”). 
226 See id. at 688 (stating that “even when shareholder dissatisfaction with board actions 
and decisions is substantial, challengers face considerable impediments to replacing boards”). 
227 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 22, at 377 (“[T]he board’s power to adopt and amend bylaw 
provisions may, for a variety of reasons, be greater than the shareholders’ corresponding 
power to do so.”). 
228 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors . . . .”). 
229 See Stephen Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 6-9 (2002) (explaining rationale behind director power in corporate law). 
230 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (using 
enhanced scrutiny to review board’s adoption of defensive mechanisms); Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (using enhanced scrutiny to review board’s 
rejection of shareholder demand in derivative suit). 
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and organizational incentives to draft these new procedures. This Section first 
explores why institutional investors are better positioned than other potential 
actors to draft these rules, before turning to the legal hurdles that may stand in 
their way.  
1. The Right Financial Incentives 
Institutional investors have a direct financial stake in ensuring that 
shareholder lawsuits work effectively. It is their money on the line if corporate 
managers breach their fiduciary duties or other legal obligations. It is also their 
money on the line if corporations have to pay to defend against and settle 
frivolous lawsuits. This Section first examines the economic benefits of new 
procedural rules for shareholders as a whole and then explores whether 
individual shareholders have sufficient incentives to promote these new rules.  
a. Aggregate Financial Incentives 
New procedural rules could increase the net return for shareholders because 
shareholders stand on both sides of most shareholder lawsuits. On one hand, 
shareholders are the beneficiaries of any judgments in these cases. In merger and 
securities class actions, shareholders receive their pro rata share of the settlement 
fund directly.231 In derivative suits, the recovery goes to the corporation, but still 
indirectly benefits shareholders by increasing the overall value of the 
company.232 On the other hand, shareholders also pay the costs of these cases, 
at least indirectly. When a corporation, its directors, and its officers are sued, the 
corporation typically pays its own attorneys’ fees and the fees of its directors 
and officers.233 If the case settles, the court often orders the defendant 
corporations to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees as well.234 These amounts 
ultimately come out of the shareholders’ pockets.  
The amount of money at stake can be significant. One study found that public 
pension funds reported receiving an average of $6.75 million in the prior fiscal 
 
231 See Webber, supra note 189, at 223 (stating that many investors “passively participate 
in class actions by collecting their pro rata share of settlement”). 
232 See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder 
Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 81 (2008) (“Any recovery in a derivative suit is 
returned to the corporation. As a result, shareholders may receive an indirect benefit from a 
derivative suit because of their share of ownership in the corporation, but they do not receive 
any direct financial benefit.”). 
233 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (providing for indemnification of corporate 
officers and directors). 
234 See Griffith, supra note 50, at 10 (“The plaintiffs’ lawyers, nevertheless, are entitled to 
recover their fees from the defendant corporation on the basis of the settlement’s therapeutic 
benefit.”). Even if these amounts are covered by directors and officers insurance, shareholders 
still pay through higher premiums. 
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year in recoveries from litigation.235 The potential gains in individual cases can 
be even greater, with another study finding that public pension funds seeking to 
serve as lead plaintiffs have an average claimed loss of $9.2 million.236 These 
figures suggest that improvements in how these suits function could directly 
impact investors’ bottom lines. 
Beyond these direct recoveries, new procedural rules could also increase the 
deterrent impact of shareholder litigation more broadly. Shareholder litigation 
has two goals: to compensate shareholders that have been injured financially by 
violations of the law and to deter future breaches of fiduciary duty, both by the 
managers of the targeted company and by managers at other companies.237 If 
managers see that their counterparts at other companies are being held 
accountable for their bad acts, these managers may decide to be more careful 
about their own behavior. As a result, in addition to their recovery in specific 
cases, shareholders may benefit from the policing effect on managers at the other 
companies in which they invest. 
The deterrent value of these suits will likely increase if the number of 
meritless claims is reduced. Shareholders lose financially when shareholder 
litigation becomes overrun with frivolous cases. If managers believe that they 
will be sued no matter what decisions they make—as is currently the case in 
merger litigation and, to a lesser extent, derivative litigation and securities class 
actions—shareholder litigation will not have the same impact on managerial 
behavior. Similarly, if managers know that they can get a case dismissed by 
offering relatively inconsequential disclosures or corporate governance reforms, 
they will have less fear of personal liability. Shareholder litigation is one of the 
primary means for shareholders to control managerial agency costs,238 and 
anything that compromises the effectiveness of these suits ultimately hurts 
shareholders. As a result, addressing the problems in these lawsuits would 
benefit investors as a whole, but only if the solution is also nuanced enough to 
protect meritorious suits. 
 
235 Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the 
Developing Role of Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 333 
(2008) (“We find that funds in our sample reported recovering an average of $6.75 million in 
the prior fiscal year . . . .”). 
236 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis 
of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1621 n.130, 1622 
n.134 (2006). 
237 See Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 929, 951 (2008) (“First, fiduciary duty litigation is intended to deter fiduciary 
duty breaches ex ante; second, it is intended to compensate for the losses those breaches cause 
ex post.”). 
238 See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 223, at 363 (“[B]y enabling equitable review 
of managers’ actions, shareholder litigation gives shareholders a powerful tool to protect their 
welfare and, as the Delaware Way recognizes, constrain the broad legal authority Delaware 
law invests in managers.”). 
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This point reflects a broader point about procedural rulemaking. The best 
procedural rules are written by those who do not know which side of the case 
they will eventually be on.239 Similar to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance,240 if 
drafters write procedures without knowing whether they will be the plaintiff or 
the defendant, they are much more likely to write procedural rules that aim to be 
fair and neutral. Shareholders are in exactly this position. They may be the 
plaintiffs in a future case if a corporate board engages in self-dealing or other 
egregious conduct, but they could also find themselves standing with the 
corporate defendants opposing a meritless lawsuit. Without a crystal ball, they 
simply cannot predict which side they will be on in any particular case. As a 
result, they want procedural rules that will accurately sort the cases with merit 
from those without. 
This observation sets shareholders apart from the other groups that could help 
address the problems in shareholder litigation. Shareholders are the only group 
with the right financial incentives when it comes to procedural rulemaking. 
Corporate directors, even if they are not actively facing a lawsuit, know that they 
could be defendants in these suits at some point in the future, creating a 
legitimate concern that their proposals will reflect this bias. The attorneys on 
both sides of these suits have a financial interest in making sure that these suits 
continue unabated. And judges do not have any financial skin in the game, which 
means that they often lack an incentive to come up with systemic solutions, 
especially if their caseload includes only a few shareholder suits. In short, 
although many groups may want to solve the problems in shareholder litigation, 
only shareholders are financially invested in ensuring that any solution is 
balanced enough to let the meritorious suits proceed while screening out the 
meritless ones. And, unlike judges, shareholders have the power to address these 
problems through their ability to amend corporate bylaws. 
b. Incentives for Individual Investors 
Even if shareholders as a whole have the right financial incentives to engage 
in balanced procedural rulemaking, can they overcome the collective action 
problems necessary to push these reforms? In other words, do individual 
 
239 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian 
Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 540 (2003) (“Each agent knows that 
after the veil of ignorance is lifted she will be better off with an option that lets her use the 
information she has to contract for alternative procedures that improve her prospects.”); Bruce 
L. Hay, Procedural Justice–Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1847 (1997) (“To 
the extent that impartiality is considered a central or fundamental value by the procedure 
community, it may be that this community’s own commitments require it to employ 
something like the Rawlsian procedure when designing procedure.”). 
240 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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institutional investors have enough money on the line to take the lead in these 
efforts?241 
These questions reflect the fact that procedural rulemaking is a form of 
shareholder activism, and such activism has always suffered from a free rider 
problem.242 Although all of a corporation’s shareholders may benefit from 
activism, the costs of activism are borne almost entirely by the activists 
themselves. Even if, for example, all shareholders of a given company agreed 
that heightened pleading is necessary to screen shareholder lawsuits, it may not 
be cost-effective for any single shareholder to take the lead in proposing this 
new rule. These efforts are further complicated by the fact that institutional 
investors are competing against each other to attract customers.243 As a result, 
an effort by one institution to promote firm-specific reforms may raise their 
individual costs relative to their competitors and accordingly cause them to lose 
customers.244 The key question is whether this reluctance will doom any 
procedural rulemaking efforts.  
The experience of the PSLRA provides a reason for optimism. The PSLRA 
created a rebuttable presumption that the lead plaintiff in a securities class action 
should be the shareholder applicant with the greatest financial stake in the 
litigation.245 When this statute was enacted in 1995, there was concern that few 
institutional investors would take Congress up on its invitation to lead these 
suits.246 Just like procedural rulemaking, it costs money to serve as a lead 
plaintiff in a securities class action, and an institution may find it difficult to 
recoup these costs given that the benefits of a securities class action are spread 
among all shareholders. Slowly, however, institutions got involved, and today 
institutions serve as lead plaintiffs in nearly half of all securities class actions.247  
 
241 See Romano, supra note 3, at 55 (“The efficacy of shareholder litigation as a 
governance mechanism is hampered by collective action problems because the cost of 
bringing a lawsuit, while less than the shareholders’ aggregate gain, is typically greater than 
a shareholder–plaintiff’s pro rata benefit.”). 
242 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 671, 699 (1995) (describing “institutional activism” as “classic example of a 
situation in which free riding is highly likely”). 
243 See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting 
in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1392 (2014) (“From the fund’s 
perspective, any monies spent on voting may reduce marginally the firm’s relative 
performance compared to its competitors.”). 
244 See Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 300 (2008) (“Many institutions 
were reluctant to incur the expenses of engaging in monitoring activities because this could 
depress portfolio returns, whereas any benefits would be shared with their competitors.”). 
245 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012). 
246 See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 236, at 1602 (stating in 2006 that “institutional 
investors have been slow to answer the call to become lead plaintiffs”). 
247 See id. at 1597-602. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160 
  
2019] INVESTING IN CORPORATE PROCEDURE 1417 
 
Why are institutional investors willing to participate in these suits, despite the 
collective action problems? The institutions that most commonly serve as lead 
plaintiffs are not hedge funds or private equity funds—institutions with a single-
minded focus on their short-term financial returns. Instead, more often than not, 
the institutions that have stepped up to serve as plaintiffs in these suits are public 
pension or labor funds.248 As other scholars have documented, these funds are 
“not motivated by purely economic interests in deciding to take part in 
litigation.”249 Instead, “[i]n addition to believing that they can improve 
settlements to their own benefit, lead plaintiff applicants may be motivated to 
serve by a sense of moral and civic duty to act in the face of fraud.”250 Their 
participation benefits securities litigation, as suits filed by public pension or 
labor funds are associated with greater recoveries and lower attorneys’ fees than 
suits filed by other types of plaintiffs.251 One could imagine these same 
institutions being the first movers in procedural rulemaking. 
Other types of institutions are also focused on broader issues of governance 
and accountability as a way to enhance the value of their investment portfolios. 
Vanguard, for example, has four pillars of corporate governance that guide its 
investments. In its pillar of governance structure, Vanguard states, “We believe 
that shareholders should be able to hold directors accountable as needed through 
certain governance and bylaw provisions.”252 Similarly, BlackRock recently 
stated that its “philosophy on corporate governance” included the core idea that 
“[c]ompanies and their boards should be accountable to shareholders and 
structured with appropriate checks and balances to ensure that they operate in 
shareholders’ interests.”253 In other words, these institutions think that board 
accountability is so crucial to their financial strategy that they have put it front 
and center in their investment plans. Procedural rulemaking is entirely consistent 
with this investment strategy because it enhances one of the primary means of 
holding board members accountable. 
 
248 James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are 
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
355, 369-70 (2008). 
249 David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 157, 174 (2012). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 159 (noting improved outcomes for shareholders when public pension or labor 
funds take lead plaintiff position). 
252 Investment Stewardship Pillars, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-
stewardship/investment-stewardship-pillars/ [https://perma.cc/LK78-F9H2] (last visited Apr. 
6, 2019). 
253 BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & 




 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160 
  
1418 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1367 
 
These institutions could also take steps to reduce the costs of procedural 
rulemaking. A number of different companies could use a single set of 
procedural rules. Institutional investors could draft—or hire procedural experts 
to draft—a common set of proposed rules, and then work to get these rules 
adopted at a number of the companies in which they invest. In this way, the costs 
of drafting these rules would be divided among the different companies in their 
investment portfolio. Institutional investors could also work together to draft 
these rules, further lowering their individual costs.254 Or, as discussed in greater 
detail below, proxy advisory services, such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services, could draft a common set of proposed rules that its member companies 
could then propose to the companies in which they invest, thereby spreading the 
costs across many investors.255 Any of these options would allow investors to 
spread the costs of procedural rulemaking across their portfolio. In short, 
collective action could solve the collective action problem.  
Putting all of this together, institutional investors stand on both sides of 
shareholder lawsuits, receiving any financial benefits but also paying the costs. 
As a result, as a group, these investors have the greatest financial incentive to 
fix the problems in these suits. The challenge comes in encouraging individual 
institutions to overcome the free rider problem to promote new procedural rules. 
Public pension and labor funds, or other like-minded institutional investors, are 
best suited to take the lead in these reforms because they are committed to 
corporate governance more broadly and thus are more willing to incur the costs 
of implementing these rules.  
2. The Right Organizational Structure 
Institutional investors, including public pension and labor funds, also have the 
right organizational structure to engage in procedural rulemaking. As this 
Section discusses, institutional investors are already engaged in a variety of 
activism efforts, and procedural rulemaking would complement these existing 
efforts. It would also allow them to have a broader impact on shareholder 
litigation compared to their current practice of serving as plaintiffs in individual 
lawsuits. This Section first discusses how procedural rulemaking would fit into 
the larger sphere of shareholder activism before turning to the specific means by 
which institutional investors could promote new procedural rules.  
a. A Complementary Form of Activism 
Over the last twenty years, institutional investors have been increasingly 
active in attempting to influence their portfolio companies. In 2016 alone, 
investors put forth more than five hundred shareholder proposals at U.S. publicly 
 
254 See, e.g., Choi & Fisch, supra note 235, at 319 (discussing “coalition-building efforts 
between more activist and less activist funds” in promoting corporate governance reform). 
255 See infra notes 262-264 and accompanying text (detailing actions taken by proxy 
advisory services). 
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traded companies, more than half of which related to issues of corporate 
governance.256 Activists also launched proxy contests and engaged in other 
efforts to gain board representation in more than one hundred campaigns in the 
2017 proxy season, and these efforts have been increasingly successful.257 
Finally, as discussed above, institutional investors constitute nearly half of the 
lead plaintiffs in securities class actions, and they file a significant percentage of 
merger class actions and shareholder derivative suits.258 Overall, spending on 
shareholder activism now exceeds forty billion dollars per year,259 with one 
leading law firm stating that the rise of shareholder activism over the past decade 
has caused a “seismic shift” in the relationship between corporations and their 
shareholders.260 
As a result, large investors already have staffs and infrastructure devoted to 
corporate governance efforts.261 These staffs are often small, but they think 
systematically about how to improve corporate governance across their portfolio 
companies.262 Many investors have also published detailed corporate 
 
256 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 1 (2017), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2017_Proxy_Season_Rev
iew.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KR8-LSZ6] (outlining statistics related to shareholder proposals). 
257 See J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., THE 2017 PROXY SEASON: GLOBALIZATION AND A NEW 
NORMAL FOR SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 11-12 (2017), https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/ 
1320739681811.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z5G-LSQK] (discussing success rate of proxy votes 
that went to vote). 
258 See David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical 
Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 907 (2014) (finding that “institutional investors play as large of a role 
in these cases as they do in federal securities fraud class actions, leading 41% of them”). 
259 See Christopher P. Skroupa, 2017 and Beyond—Major Trends Shaping Shareholder 
Activism, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2017, 8:43 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christophers 
kroupa/2017/10/31/2017-and-beyond-major-trends-shaping-shareholder-activism/#171bd68 
c15e7 [https://perma.cc/DY28-WUEG] (“Activist shareholders have deployed $45 billion in 
new campaigns year to date, nearly double the amount for all of 2016.”). 
260 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2016 U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM REVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS 1 (2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_ 
2016_U.S._Shareholder_Activism_Review_and_Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/734X-58 
5N] (“The past decade has seen a seismic shift in the relations between companies and their 
shareholders.”). 
261 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction 
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 483 
(2014) (“[C]ertain institutional investors have staffs who have jobs and influence largely 
because of the proliferating number of votes that stockholders are asked to cast.”). 
262 See George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 
1301 (“Many institutions (especially the larger ones) maintain internal staffs to research proxy 
issues, and they often reject the advice of a proxy advisor and follow the contrary 
recommendations of their own staffs.”). 
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governance principles that inform their voting practices.263 Proxy advisory 
services support these efforts, providing detailed recommendations to 
institutional investors on specific issues.264 
Shareholder litigation has been largely absent from these efforts. Some public 
pension and labor funds regularly serve as representative plaintiffs in 
shareholder lawsuits, but otherwise most institutional investors have not paid 
much attention to what happens in the courtroom. Activist investors are focused 
on market-based forms of activism, seeking to unseat directors or pushing 
shareholder proposals to change specific governance practices, rather than filing 
shareholder lawsuits.265 
This strategy has drawbacks. Market-based activism aims to create a solid 
governance foundation within target corporations, ensuring that people with the 
right skills and incentives are on corporate boards and that these boards are 
pursuing the right management strategies. These efforts are crucial, but they 
offer little protection to shareholders if things go wrong. Even the best 
governance foundation cannot prevent every form of managerial wrongdoing. 
Indeed, if corporate law teaches us anything, it is that managers are ever-creative 
when it comes to enriching themselves at the expense of shareholders. Litigation 
supported by the right procedural rules is therefore an essential complement to 
existing forms of shareholder activism. 
Procedural rulemaking is also a more influential strategy than serving as 
plaintiffs in individual lawsuits. By serving as representative plaintiffs, 
institutional investors can influence the individual cases in which they serve, but 
they cannot stop other shareholders from filing their own meritless suits. 
Investors can object to settlements in these other cases, but this is also a 
piecemeal approach to litigation reform because objectors have to appear in 
individual cases to contest the settlement.266 In addition, serving as an objector 
only allows shareholders to object at the final stage of the litigation.267 It does 
not allow them to object to other litigation decisions, including whether to file 
the case in the first place.  
Serving as a lead plaintiff also puts heavy demands on an institution’s time 
and resources. One institutional investor, for example, stated that it costs 
between twenty-five thousand and one hundred thousand dollars of 
 
263 See, e.g., supra notes 252-253 and accompanying text (discussing governance 
principles of BlackRock and Vanguard). 
264 See Edelman, Thomas & Thompson, supra note 243, at 1361 (“[T]he birth of proxy 
advisory firms, including Institutional Shareholder Services (‘ISS’), . . . help[ed] address the 
costs of voting and the collective action problems inherent in coordinated institutional 
shareholder action.”). 
265 See supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text (discussing statistics associated with 
activist investors). 
266 See, e.g., Schultz v. Ginsburg, 965 A.2d 661, 669-71 (Del. 2009) (discussing standards 
objectors must meet to nullify security class action settlement). 
267 See id. 
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unreimbursed staff time to serve as lead plaintiff.268 Given the time burdens, this 
institution stated that it can only serve as lead plaintiff in one or two cases at a 
time.269 Some scholars have suggested that it is only worth an institutional 
investor’s time and money to serve as lead plaintiff if the investor has at least 
one million dollars at stake in the litigation.270 Even apart from these financial 
constraints, the PSLRA places a limit on the number of cases in which an 
institutional investor can serve as lead plaintiff.271 As a result, there are both 
economic and legal limitations to how many cases investors can influence by 
serving as lead plaintiff. 
In contrast, procedural rulemaking offers a number of advantages. As noted 
above, a single set of rules can be used at a number of companies. By investing 
the time and money to draft a single set of rules, investors can impact litigation 
practices across their investment portfolio. 
Moreover, procedural rulemaking may appeal to a broader group of 
institutional investors. Prior empirical work revealed that, although many 
institutional investors care deeply about corporate governance, they do not 
engage in shareholder activism because they do not want to take a 
confrontational stance toward corporate management.272 Trying to unseat a 
board member or block a deal proposed by the board pits institutional 
shareholders against management in a way that can have long-term ramifications 
for an institution’s relationship with the company. This is especially true if the 
institution has other business dealings with the company. Similarly, institutions 
inevitably come into conflict with management when they agree to serve as 
representative plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits. However, the process of 
adopting new procedural rules does not need to be antagonistic. Rather than a 
zero-sum negotiation, shareholders can work with corporate boards to craft new 
procedural rules. Procedural rulemaking can be a more cooperative enterprise 
than most other forms of shareholder activism. 
 
268 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 236, at 1621 n.130 (discussing cost of litigation and 
burden of litigation on firms). 
269 See id. at 1622 n.134 (“One institutional investor has told us that because of staffing 
limits, it can only take on one or two cases at a time. To focus on the biggest impact cases, its 
threshold claim for considering a lead plaintiff position is $7 million.”). 
270 See id. at 1621 (“In any event, this analysis suggests that a minimum claim size of $1 
million is necessary for an institution to give serious consideration to becoming a lead 
plaintiff.”). 
271 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2012) (limiting number of cases in which plaintiff can 
be a lead plaintiff to five at time unless court permission is received). 
272 See Choi & Fisch, supra note 235, at 319 (stating that institutional investors attribute 
their lack of involvement in activist activities in part to “their desire to avoid confrontational 
behavior”). 
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b. Two Paths to Procedural Reform 
Institutional investors may be organizationally well-suited to engage in 
procedural rulemaking, but it would not necessarily be easy for them to get their 
portfolio companies to adopt these procedures. Institutional investors have two 
different paths available to them when it comes to adding new procedures to a 
corporation’s bylaws. 
First, they could propose the amendments to the bylaws themselves, although 
this is easier said than done. Delaware corporate law gives shareholders the right 
to amend corporate bylaws,273 but it does not make it easy for them to come 
together to do so. An investor can propose a bylaw amendment to be voted upon 
by shareholders at a corporation’s annual meeting. To do so, however, it would 
need to solicit the proxies of other shareholders in support of its proposal,274 a 
time-intensive and expensive process. Alternatively, it can include its proposal 
on the corporation’s proxy, which is subject to a host of complex requirements 
under the federal securities laws.275 Shareholders could also act to amend the 
bylaws outside of the annual meeting through written consent,276 but the 
dispersed ownership at most public corporations makes this option difficult as 
well. These options are all possible, but the time and expense associated with 
them would discourage all but the most committed shareholders. 
A more feasible option is for institutional investors to work with corporate 
boards to draft new procedural rules. It is far easier for boards to amend the 
bylaws because they can do so at a regularly-scheduled board meeting.277 For all 
of the reasons discussed above, boards should not have sole control over the 
rulemaking process, but they could partner with institutional investors to put into 
place neutral rules that curb the excesses of shareholder litigation without 
screening out meritorious suits. In this way, institutional investors could provide 
thought leadership on these issues without incurring the cost of a proxy 
campaign. This approach is consistent with a growing trend in corporate law of 
institutions and boards working together to influence corporate governance.278 
 
273 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (outlining requirements for giving proper 
notice). 
274 See Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad 
Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 28 (2011) (arguing that, 
“as a practical matter,” shareholders’ ability to amend corporate bylaws “can be 
operationalized in a typical public company only by aggregating proxies in favor of the 
proposal from a large number of minority shareholders—a costly endeavor indeed”). 
275 As one example, the proposal can only be five hundred words. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(c), (d) (2018). It would be nearly impossible to craft and defend specific procedural reforms 
within this small number of words. 
276 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (providing for written consent in lieu of meeting). 
277 See id. § 109(b) (providing for director vote to amend bylaws). 
278 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 821, 831 (reviewing evidence that “significant number of investors [have] sought 
greater engagement with the board” and stating that “shareholders and their advocates have 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160 
  
2019] INVESTING IN CORPORATE PROCEDURE 1423 
 
Studies demonstrate that institutional investors routinely work with boards to 
achieve their desired reforms. For example, one study found that one-third of 
public pension and labor funds attempted to influence corporate managers 
through direct negotiation or letters.279 Another study examined the activism 
efforts of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of American-College 
Retirement Equities Fund (“TIAA-CREF”) and found that the companies came 
to an agreement with the target company before a formal vote more than seventy 
percent of the time.280 Across different forms of activism, shareholders are 
increasingly negotiating for the relief they want, rather than entering into pitched 
battles with corporate boards.281 Accordingly, the type of cooperative 
engagement proposed here is not unusual in the world of shareholder activism.  
This engagement would ideally occur when there is no ongoing shareholder 
litigation at the company at issue and, therefore, the board would not have their 
own potential liability front and center in their minds. During this process, 
shareholders will have to be cognizant of directors’ structural bias, but they can 
also benefit from boards’ wisdom and experience in participating in these suits. 
This partnership would address the oft-raised concern that shareholder activism 
preempts the role of corporate boards in managing corporations,282 while also 
addressing the reality that boards have a conflict of interest, meaning they should 
not have unchecked power to propose new limitations on shareholder litigation.  
c. Explaining the Status Quo 
If there is money to be made and cooperative relationships to be formed from 
procedural rulemaking, why are shareholders not already exploring this option? 
 
proposed a range of different strategies for increasing their interactions with board members 
from annual corporate governance calls with directors, to periodic ‘investor days’ at the 
corporation spearheaded by directors”); Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of 
Private Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171, 171-72 (2009) (“An increasing 
number of shareholders are demonstrating a preference for negotiations over such traditional 
forms of activism as shareholder proposals, proxy contests, and litigation.”). 
279 See Choi & Fisch, supra note 235, at 329. 
280 See Willard T. Carleton, James M. Nelson & Michael S. Weisbach, The Influence of 
Institutions on Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-
CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1335 (1998). 
281 See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering 
of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 265 (2016) (“The shareholder proposal settlement has 
become increasingly popular as a tool for negotiating private rules for corporations on matters 
that are, by long tradition, subjects of public regulation.”); Lee Harris, Corporate Elections 
and Tactical Settlements, 39 J. CORP. L. 221, 224 (2014) (describing “elaborate dance” by 
corporate boards “to avoid a contested corporate election”). 
282 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 601, 626 (2006) (“Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking 
seems likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable; 
namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board 
of directors.”). 
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In many respects, this is the million-dollar question. Sophisticated investors, 
after all, do not usually leave money or opportunity on the table. The fact that 
they have not gotten into the procedural rulemaking business perhaps suggests 
that they might not be interested in this new form of activism. 
There are, however, other explanations for the current state of affairs. First, 
procedural innovation in corporate charters and bylaws is a fairly new 
development. The Delaware Court of Chancery did not suggest it as an option 
until 2010, and even then it was only raised in the context of forum-selection 
bylaws.283 Boards led the next round of procedural rulemaking involving fee-
shifting bylaws, which were subject to a significant amount of criticism and legal 
wrangling (and for good reason, as discussed in Part II).284 Throughout this 
period, many institutional investors were watching carefully, with Institutional 
Shareholder Services advising companies to vote against most fee-shifting 
bylaws.285 More generally, however, procedural rulemaking may be in a holding 
pattern of sorts while the financial markets seek to better understand its legal 
limits.  
Second, procedural rulemaking is out of most institutional investors’ normal 
wheelhouse. Institutional investors are experts in judging financial risk and 
pricing companies, not altering legal rules. And altering legal rules is not child’s 
play. It is difficult to predict the exact impact of raising pleading standards or 
changing the scope of discovery. It may not occur to financial analysts to tinker 
with the legal rules governing shareholder lawsuits, and even if it does, they may 
fear that they will accidentally make the problems in these suits even worse. 
Finally, the market is not as efficient or rational as we sometimes think. 
Investors are skilled at pricing companies, but this expertise does not necessarily 
translate into other ways of making money. A 2005 study, for example, found 
that institutional investors rarely submit claims in securities class action 
settlements, even though these claims could be worth significant amounts of 
money.286 The authors tracked one hundred eighteen settlements in securities 
 
283 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“If they do, and 
if boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an 
efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to 
respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”). 
284 See, e.g., Lebovitch & van Kwawegen, supra note 14, at 515-16. 
285 See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES SUMMARY PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES: 2017 BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (2016), https://www.issgover 
nance.com/file/policy/2017-us-summary-voting-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWE7-8T 
8N] (“Generally vote against bylaws that mandate fee-shifting whenver plaintiffs are not 
completely successful on the merits . . . .”). 
286 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Their Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to 
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 454 (2005) (“[W]e 
determine that a large majority of institutional investors failed to file claims in securities fraud 
class action settlements.”). 
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class actions, finding that only twenty eight percent of institutional investors 
filed claims in these settlements,287 despite the fact that the average mean loss 
was approximately eight hundred fifty thousand dollars.288 Collectively, the 
authors concluded that institutional investors let “billions slip through their 
fingers,” which they attributed in part to organizational lapses within these 
institutions.289 This example illustrates that institutional investors are only 
human, at least metaphorically speaking. They focus on their strengths—valuing 
companies and assessing risk—but pay less attention to matters outside their 
traditional expertise.290 
Yet the example of the PSLRA demonstrates the possibility of changing the 
status quo when it comes to investor inaction. It took institutional investors a 
while to take Congress up on its invitation to serve as lead plaintiff in securities 
class actions, but eventually they did.291 The market, in other words, can be 
sticky but ultimately responsive. It sometimes takes time for investors to 
recognize economic opportunities, but in the past, they have responded once 
these opportunities are brought to their attention. 
C. Legal Pathways 
If institutional investors decide that they want to take on this new role, will 
the law stand in their way? In other words, can institutional investors actually 
change the procedural rules in the ways suggested here? Contracting parties have 
long opted out of certain default rules governing how their future disputes will 
be decided.292 Parties, for example, can add forum selection clauses to their 
agreements to direct their disputes to a specific court.293 They can also adopt 
 
287 See id. at 420-25. 
288 See id. at 424 (“We find that the average loss is roughly $275,000, which is substantially 
lower than the almost $850,000 average value reported.”). 
289 See id. at 425-32 (outlining four reasons for failure of institutional investors to join 
class actions: (1) “[f]inancial service providers try not to align themselves with protagonists 
of their clientele”; (2) class actions are slow and institutional investors may not have time; (3) 
negative perceptions of class action returns, despite evidence to the contrary; and (4) 
communication issues between broker and the corporation). 
290 See id. 
291 See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 236, at 1602 (“Despite this impressive list of 
benefits, investors have been slow to answer the call to become lead plaintiffs.”). 
292 See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 507, 512 (2011) (describing “widespread perception that customized procedure 
is an increasingly important feature of contracting practice among U.S. firms”); Judith Resnik, 
Procedure As Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005) (“[M]ini-codes of civil 
procedure are being created by courts, agencies, and a multitude of private providers. The 
aspiration for a trans-substantive procedural regime embedded in the Federal Rules has been 
supplanted by an array of contextualized processes.”). 
293 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991) (upholding forum 
selection clause on back of cruise ship ticket). 
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arbitration clauses to opt out of the judicial system altogether,294 and agree on 
how they will allocate the costs of litigation.295 The procedures suggested in this 
Article, however, go well beyond the dispute resolution provisions typically 
included in commercial contracts.296 This Section addresses the legal hurdles 
that institutional investors may face in implementing customized procedural 
rules. It first explores possible restrictions under corporate and securities laws 
before turning to limitations arising under procedural law. As we will see, there 
are not clear legal guidelines, although recent case law provides investors with 
reason to be more optimistic about their ability to engage in procedural private 
ordering in cases filed under state law as opposed to cases filed under federal 
law. 
1. Corporate and Securities Laws 
The procedural rules outlined in this Section relate to both fiduciary duty 
claims made under state law and securities class actions filed under the federal 
securities laws. As a result, these rules will have to pass muster under both state 
corporate law and federal securities law, at least if they purport to cover both 
types of claims. At the state level, Delaware has been the pioneer in addressing 
private ordering in shareholder litigation, with few other states addressing the 
issue. As discussed above, the Delaware Court of Chancery itself first raised297 
the issue and upheld various types of procedural amendments to corporate 
bylaws.298 The Delaware legislature banned one specific form of private 
 
294 See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (holding that the 
Federal Arbitration Act does not permit states to prohibit class action waivers in arbitration 
contracts). 
295 See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 
419 (“In the EDGAR database, terms shifting costs to the losing party in litigation are 
omnipresent.”); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865, 1922 (2015) (finding that 23.9% of sample contracts included 
loser-pay provisions). 
296 See Hoffman, supra note 295, at 395-96 (“We appear to be currently in a period where 
some terms are widely accepted—like forum selection—while others operate only at the 
margins—like those that would limit discovery.”). 
297 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of 
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and 
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with 
charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”). 
298 See, e.g., ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) 
(“[W]e hold that fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and 
enforceable under Delaware law.”); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 
A.3d 934, 956 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The plaintiffs’ argument that stockholders must approve a 
forum selection bylaw for it to be contractually binding is an interpretation that contradicts 
the plain terms of the contractual framework chosen by stockholders who buy stock.”). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160 
  
2019] INVESTING IN CORPORATE PROCEDURE 1427 
 
ordering (fee-shifting provisions)299 but it has expressly permitted forum 
selection bylaws (as long as Delaware is the selected forum) and stayed silent 
on other forms of private ordering.300 
This does not mean that Delaware courts would approve all forms of 
procedural private ordering. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the 
Supreme Court of Delaware held that fee-shifting bylaws are facially valid.301 It 
then noted, however, that whether a specific bylaw provision is enforceable 
depends “on the manner in which it was adopted and the circumstances under 
which it was invoked.”302 The Court then referenced earlier decisions 
invalidating bylaws that were enacted by directors to protect their positions as 
board members or by a controlling shareholder seeking to enlarge its own power 
in inequitable ways.303 Although the Delaware legislature later prohibited fee-
shifting bylaws,304 the court’s analysis provides a useful framework for 
analyzing other possible forms of private ordering related to shareholder 
litigation. 
Under this framework, the proposed procedures set out above should be 
facially permissible.305 The motives of the enacting party (either the board or 
majority shareholders) matter, however, so a court could theoretically strike 
down a bylaw amendment adopted at a specific company if the court believed 
that the amendment was motivated by selfish or other improper motives.306 For 
example, if a controlling shareholder included a bylaw amendment that made it 
impossible for any other shareholders to challenge the controller’s breach of 
fiduciary duty, a Delaware court would likely invalidate the bylaw.307 In general, 
however, Delaware currently gives corporations wide latitude to amend the rules 
governing shareholder litigation. 
That said, private ordering is still a relatively new phenomenon in Delaware, 
and new limitations could emerge, especially as Delaware is asked to evaluate 
new variants of procedural bylaws. Some scholars have suggested that 
 
299 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (“The bylaws may not contain any provision 
that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the 
corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim.”). 
300 See id. § 115 (“The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent 
with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims shall be 
brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State.”). 
301 See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014). 
302 See id. 
303 See id. at 558-59 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) 
(setting aside board adopted amendment that moved meeting one month earlier); Hollinger 
Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch. 2004) (enjoining bylaw that required 
unanimous assent on any board action)). 
304 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b). 
305 See supra Part II (discussing proposed procedures). 
306 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558-59. 
307 See id. 
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Delaware’s permissive approach may not always be appropriate.308 Professor 
Verity Winship, for example, has noted that section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law permits corporations to eliminate the liability of 
directors for violations of the duty of care, but not the duty of loyalty.309 On its 
face, this restriction concerns the substantive law, not procedural rules, but 
substance and procedure are not wholly separate. Given section 102(b)(7) 
limitations, a corporation should not be able to use procedural rules to block 
claims that it is not allowed to eliminate directly.310 As an example, a standing 
requirement that is so stringent that makes it impossible for any shareholder to 
file a duty of loyalty claim would contravene section 102(b)(7), despite its 
procedural frame. Similarly, a heightened pleading requirement that required 
representative plaintiffs to plead information to which they do not have access 
could also run afoul of the law. The procedures set out in Part II, however, are 
intended to better sort fiduciary duty claims, not rule them out entirely, and thus 
should be permissible.311 Accordingly, even if Delaware does adopt additional 
limits on private ordering, investors should still be able to adopt the suggestions 
in this Article, at least when it comes to fiduciary duty claims. 
The federal securities laws raise far greater hurdles for shareholders seeking 
to experiment with customized procedure.312 The securities laws expressly 
invalidate “any . . . provision binding any person . . . [to] waive compliance with 
any provision” of the securities laws.313 The Supreme Court held that a provision 
is void under securities laws if it “weaken[s] [a party’s] ability to recover.”314 
Interpreting this standard, the Court has further held that mandatory arbitration 
clauses do not run afoul of this provision because plaintiffs can still recover on 
 
308 See, e.g., Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 223, at 357-58 (arguing that bylaw 
changes should be governed by Unocal standard). 
309 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); Winship, supra note 20, at 524-25 (explaining 
limitations imposed by section 102(b)(7)). 
310 See Winship, supra note 20, at 525 (stating that this approach “would not prevent 
procedural limits that fall short of waiver”). 
311 Delaware has also held that, although shareholders can amend corporate bylaws on 
their own, their amendments cannot infringe on the board’s fundamental right to control the 
business and affairs of the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). Delaware courts 
have held that this limitation means that shareholder-driven amendments to corporate bylaws 
can only “define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made.” See CA, 
Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008). This limitation should 
not affect the proposals in this Article, which, by definition, relate to procedural matters. 
312 See Winship, supra note 20, at 529-30 (stating that “securities law does not have an 
enabling structure that would support broad experimentation”). 
313 See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012); id. § 78cc(a) (“Any condition stipulation, or provision 
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”). 
314 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) (quoting Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)). 
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their claims within arbitration.315 Scholars have speculated, however, that other 
types of customized procedures would not pass muster if they make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to recover on their claims.316 
This interpretation could call into question some of the procedures 
recommended in this Article, at least when applied to federal securities class 
actions. Standing requirements, for example, would not only weaken certain 
shareholders’ right to sue, but bar them entirely. Similarly, fee-shifting or cost-
shifting provisions could discourage shareholders from suing if they fear that 
they could later be held personally liable for the defendants’ fees and costs. As 
a result, the securities laws may well prohibit these forms of customized 
procedure.317  
Other forms, however, should pass muster. Nonwaivable forum selection 
clauses, for example, simply specify where shareholders must sue; they do not 
weaken their right to sue. Similarly, bans on nonmonetary settlements limit the 
forms of relief that shareholders can obtain, but do not impact whether 
shareholders can sue in the first instance. This analysis means that the securities 
laws may permit a narrower range of procedures than state corporate law, but at 
least some of the proposed procedures are likely still permissible. In drafting 
their proposed bylaws, however, shareholders should be careful to limit the 
applicability of those procedures that may run afoul of the securities laws.318 
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently addressed another possible legal 
hurdle related to procedural private ordering in federal securities class actions. 
Building on the scholarship of Professor Ann Lipton,319 the Delaware Court of 
Chancery recognized that charters and bylaws are intended only to address the 
internal affairs of corporations, including “the fiduciary relationships that exist 
within the corporate form.”320 In contrast, the court held that these state-created 
documents cannot limit the laws of other sovereigns, including the federal 
securities laws, even if the plaintiff is a shareholder of the corporation in 
 
315 See id. (“The voluntariness of the agreement is irrelevant to this inquiry: if a stipulation 
waives compliance with a statutory duty, it is void under § 29(a), whether voluntary or not.”). 
316 See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Intersection of Fee-Shifting Bylaws and 
Securities Fraud Litigation, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 403 (2015) (acknowledging that “no 
court has yet addressed whether a fee-shifting bylaw is void under the anti-waiver provisions 
as applied to federal securities law claims,” but stating that he believes that they would be 
void because “a fee-shifting bylaw weakens [shareholders’] ability to recover under federal 
securities law”). 
317 See Shearson/Am. Express, 480 U.S. at 220. 
318 See, e.g., HeartWare Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 27, 2016) (adopting 
forum selection clause that only applied to state fiduciary duty claims). 
319 See Lipton, supra note 214, at 597 (“Corporate governance regulation concerns the 
balance of power between its shareholders, its officers, and its directors, and commonly falls 
within the rubric understood as the corporations’ ‘internal affairs.’”). 
320 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 19, 2018). 
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question.321 As a result, the court invalidated a charter provision that required 
the corporation in question’s shareholders to bring all claims under the Securities 
Act of 1933 in federal court.322 
This case creates another hurdle for institutional investors who may want to 
alter the procedural rules that govern securities class actions. Viewing these 
hurdles in tandem, federal law explicitly prohibits any constraint on a 
shareholder’s ability to file a federal securities claim, and state law prohibits use 
of state-created charters and bylaws to affect these claims. As a result, under 
current law at least, any amendments to procedural rules should be limited to 
shareholder lawsuits filed under state law and should explicitly disclaim 
application of these amendments to federal securities class actions. 
2. Procedural Law 
The corporate and securities laws are not the only laws that govern 
customized procedure. Shareholders must also ensure that procedural law 
permits them to amend the specific procedures in question. For example, can 
parties alter the discovery rules set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) and Twombly? Can they completely replace the federal rules governing 
discovery with their own? These questions are perhaps even more difficult than 
those in the prior Section because the field of civil procedure provides fewer 
clear guidelines. Most procedural rules do not specify whether they are default 
or mandatory rules, and courts have provided little overarching guidance on this 
question.  
Despite this legal ambiguity, there are three clear limitations. First, parties 
cannot enter into private agreements that expand the jurisdiction of the courts,323 
a limitation that in this context primarily affects forum selection bylaws. If 
shareholders propose such bylaws, they cannot choose a federal forum for all 
shareholder claims if the federal courts do not have a basis for jurisdiction over 
these claims. Conversely, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal 
securities claims, so shareholders could not choose a state court forum for these 
claims.324 Second, although there is some debate about whether bylaws are 
technically contracts,325 parties could still be subject to common-law principles 
 
321 See id. at *18 (“[A] Delaware corporation cannot use its charter or bylaws to regulate 
the forum in which parties bring external claims, such as federal securites law claims.”). 
322 Id. at *23 (“The nominal defendants lack authority to use their certificates of 
incorporation to regulate claims under the 1933 Act. The Federal Forum Provisions are 
ineffective and invalid.”). 
323 See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 180, at 583 (outlining limitations on procedural rule 
changing through contract). 
324 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012). 
325 Compare ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014) 
(holding that corporate bylaws are “contracts among a corporation’s shareholders” (quoting 
Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010))), with Lipton, supra 
note 214, at 587 (arguing that “corporate governance arrangements are not contractual”). 
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rooted in contract law, which prohibits provisions that are unconscionable or 
made under duress.326 In a number of cases, for example, courts have used the 
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate limitations on discovery that 
unreasonably limit one side’s access to information, especially in cases 
involving substantially unequal bargaining power between the parties.327 
Finally, shareholders cannot include customized procedures in corporate bylaws 
that significantly impair the rights of third parties.328 In this discovery context, 
for example, this limitation might mean that bylaws cannot expand Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 45 subpoena power to compel third parties to provide more 
information than they would otherwise have to provide in a shareholder 
lawsuit.329  
Beyond these specific limitations, scholars argue that there are other, more 
fundamental limits on parties’ ability to craft their own procedures. These 
proposed limits reflect foundational concerns about the influence of private 
parties over the workings of a deliberately public judicial system. Scholars have 
phrased this concern in different ways. Professor Sarah Randolph Cole argues 
that a court reviewing customized procedures should determine whether the 
agreement would “impermissibly undermine the institutional integrity of the 
court.”330 Professor Robert Bone argues that bespoke procedure cannot interfere 
with the judge’s ability to engage in principled reasoning, which he argues is the 
“core element of adjudication.”331 Professor Judith Resnik influentially 
criticized the contractual model of civil procedure as failing to take account of 
“substantive agendas about the meaning of justice.”332 Regardless of the specific 
phrasing, the idea is that there are certain attributes and goals of the American 
judicial system that are so fundamental to its legitimacy that private parties 
cannot contract around them.333  
 
326 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (referencing 
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability”). 
327 See, e.g., Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the 
Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 513-14 (2013) (“The availability 
of discovery has become a lynchpin of state law unconscionability, and courts have not 
hesitated to find arbitration agreements unconscionable that attempt to limit the amount of 
discovery available to plaintiffs.”). 
328 But see Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1373 (2012) (arguing that party decision-making in litigation 
may already harm third parties in number of ways, and yet no one seriously suggests 
prohibiting all party decisions that impact third parties). 
329 FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
330 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party 
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1205 (2000). 
331 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 328, at 1390. 
332 See Resnik, supra note 292, at 666 (arguing that courts should not ignore “political and 
distribution[al] consequences of procedural rulemaking”). 
333 Id. (“The deployment of process to achieve substantive goals is deeply entrenched in 
the Constitution.”). 
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These concerns reflect the fact that litigation between private parties is not an 
entirely private enterprise, as the example of shareholder litigation itself reflects. 
Shareholder litigation is not just about curtailing agency costs in the particular 
companies that are sued; these suits also aim to raise the standards of managerial 
behavior across the corporate world.334 Through the concept of general 
deterrence, multimillion dollar judgments are intended to send a message not 
just to the targeted defendants, but also to managers at other companies who are 
in a position to engage in similar misconduct.335 Even more broadly, shareholder 
litigation aspires to improve the functioning of the financial markets, ensuring 
that shareholders have sufficient confidence in the markets to invest their 
capital.336 
These aspirational goals mean that institutional investors and corporate 
boards should not have unfettered power to re-write the procedural rules that 
govern shareholder litigation. Judges must play a key role in ensuring that any 
new rules are sufficiently aligned with the public interest. Current law does not 
precisely delineate the scope of this oversight responsibility, but judges should 
review any new procedures against the backdrop of the public interest, striking 
down those that unnecessarily threaten the shareholder litigation enterprise. 
The procedures proposed in Part II should not run afoul of these limitations. 
If done right, they would not improperly expand the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, violate the unconscionability doctrine, or impair the right of third parties. 
Nor should they raise eyebrows on public policy grounds. The goal of these 
procedures is to better sort cases with merit from those without—a goal that is 
aligned with the public interest in encouraging efficient litigation. Indeed, these 
provisions should enhance the compensatory and deterrent goals of shareholder 
lawsuits, which both shareholders and the public more broadly should support. 
If investors overreach in particular instances, however, the judicial branch can 
invalidate the provisions. The legislative branch can also intervene and 
statutorily overrule the provisions, as Delaware did in the context of fee-shifting 
bylaws.337 
 
334 See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 257, 280-81 (2015) (“The norms that flow from litigation’s enforcing fiduciary 
standards strengthen sensible management of firms and thus contribute to increased economic 
activity. The norms themselves shape best practices and in that way reduce agency costs as 
well as uncertainty. Each in turn yields a public benefit.”). 
335 See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1090 (1997) (stating that three benefits of shareholder litigation 
normally mentioned are “compensation, specific deterrence, and general deterrence”). 
336 See, e.g., id. at 1099-105. 
337 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019); Francis Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New 
Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 
2015), https://www.delawarelitigation.com/2015/03/articles/commentary/delaware-proposes 
-new-fee-shifting-and-forum-selection-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/J7JD-Z4SY] 
(describing process leading up to the legislation). 
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In the end, shareholders have a crucial role to play in reforming shareholder 
litigation, but they cannot re-draft procedural rules in a vacuum. Shareholder 
litigation has both public and private aims, and any new procedures adopted 
among private parties must be subject to public oversight by judges and 
legislators. The question therefore is not whether shareholders should control 
these lawsuits to the exclusion of other gatekeepers. Instead, it is whether 
shareholders should play a more active role in this area than they currently do, 
while still subject to oversight by judges and legislators. A rulemaking 
partnership will protect the public interest more than any of the individual 
gatekeepers will do on their own. 
Stepping back, therefore, procedural law likely places fewer limits on 
investors’ ability to rewrite procedural rules than the state and federal 
substantive law. As discussed above, given current SEC regulations and relevant 
case law, institutional investors can likely rewrite the procedural rules that 
govern shareholder lawsuits filed under state law.338 On the other hand, they are 
likely to face significant legal challenges if they extend their efforts to federal 
securities class actions.339 Investors, however, should not view these limitations 
as a reason to stay away from procedural private ordering altogether. Rewriting 
the procedural rules that govern state fiduciary duty claims would have a 
significant impact on this entire category of litigation, which includes nearly all 
shareholder derivative suits and many merger class actions.  
Just as importantly, the rules related to procedural private ordering are still in 
their infancy. It has been less than a decade since the Delaware Court of 
Chancery first suggested that corporations adopt forum selection clauses for 
these state claims,340 and courts and the SEC are just starting to envision the 
possibilities of private ordering in this legal sphere. Moreover, much of the 
concern about procedural private ordering stems from the fact that corporate 
boards have driven these efforts, and the results have reflected their bias and 
self-interest. Allowing institutional investors to lead this effort does not raise the 
same concerns because they have the right financial incentives to adopt 
measured procedural reforms. If they are successful in reforming shareholder 
lawsuits filed under state law, perhaps lawmakers will expand their ability to 
impact lawsuits filed under federal law as well. In short, the time has come to 
experiment more broadly with procedural private ordering, especially if this 
experimentation is in the hands of those with the most financial skin in the game. 
CONCLUSION 
Shareholder litigation is a failed experiment. Judges, legislatures, and 
corporate boards have all tried to fix the problems with these suits, but none of 
their proposals have worked. This troubled history presents an opportunity for a 
 
338 See supra notes 312-318 and accompanying text (discussing possible procedural 
limitations due to SEC rules). 
339 See supra notes 312-318 and accompanying text.  
340 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413160 
  
1434 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1367 
 
new group—institutional investors—to take the lead in reforming this area of 
the law. Institutional investors are uniquely situated to take on this challenge 
because they stand on both sides of shareholder lawsuits. As a result, they have 
financial incentives that the other groups which have tried to reform these suits 
do not. Investors can use this position to draw on lessons from the field of civil 
procedure, which offers specific solutions to the problems in these cases. 
Corporate law has already started to experiment with new procedural rules in 
corporate bylaws, but investors can go much further, adopting an array of 
procedural options to address the specific challenges in shareholder litigation. 
This proposal also offers broader lessons about private ordering in the 
litigation system. In most types of litigation, private ordering is one-sided, with 
defendants writing the provisions that will govern future litigation. Corporations 
and consumers, for example, are equally bound by dispute resolution provisions 
included in commercial contracts, even though corporations have nearly 
exclusive control over the drafting of these provisions.341 This disparity is then 
reflected in the content of the provisions, with the inclusion of arbitration 
provisions, class action waivers, and fee-shifting provisions that have sparked 
broad public and scholarly apprehension.342 Shareholder litigation, however, is 
one of the few areas where the same party stands on both sides of the litigation. 
This unique positioning opens the door to a new approach to private ordering in 
litigation that balances the competing interests in a more equitable way. 
Corporate law should capitalize on this opportunity and give shareholders a 
chance to reform shareholder litigation.  
 
 
341 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in 
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 431 (2002) (“Likely ninety-nine percent of paper 
contracts consist of standard forms, and now, with increasing alacrity, people agree to terms 
by clicking away at electronic standard forms on web sites and while installing software 
(‘clickwrap’ contracts).”). 
342 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873 (2011) 
(discussing “how to repair contracts that contain excessively one-sided terms”); Daniel Akst, 
Opinion, Those Crazy Indemnity Forms We All Sign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, at SR4. 
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